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ABSTRACT

Wellman, Caroline E. M.P.A., Master of Public Administration Program, Department of
Urban Affairs and Geography, Wright State University, 2011. Negotiated Regulation:
The Ohio Livestock Care Standards Board as a Model Regulatory Process.

Using a comparative framework and based on interviews with the primary actors
involved in the debate for and against humane farm animal standards in Ohio, this thesis
examines the roles of special and public interest groups, bureaucrats, technocrats, and the
public in the rulemaking process of the Ohio Livestock Care Standards Board. This
study finds that the creation of the board as a policy solution was likely impossible
without the efforts of a policy entrepreneur and a “fixer;” that the board’s relevance relies
on a problem-setting approach to developing standards that includes a multitude of
interests; and that continued public interest group pressure prevents the board from being
captured by special interests. The author concludes that Ohio’s approach, slightly
modified, can be used as a model for other states and that a collaborative process,
accountable to the public, can result in strong public policy recommendations even when
interests seem divergent.
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I. INTEREST GROUPS AND TECHNOCRATS IN DIRECT
DEMOCRACY AND RULEMAKING
At its most basic, the problems of public administration are how best to balance
bureaucracy and democracy, politics and administration, and ultimately, efficiency and
responsiveness (Denhardt and Denhardt, 16-20). In short, who gets what and how. The
debate over how best to develop and implement humane livestock standards, or farm
animal welfare policy, is no exception. Striking the balance between the initiative
process and attempts to preempt it; between the emotion and politics of humane farm
animal treatment and how best to guide related decisions; and how to take into
consideration the economic and social implications of stricter standards while being
responsive to shifting consumer values is at the heart of the state-level debate about farm
animal welfare policy, legislation and governance. This thesis examines the approach
Ohio has taken in developing farm animal welfare policy, compares it to what has
occurred in other states, and attempts to define a model that other states may follow in
their attempts to develop processes to address the expanding discussion on farm animal
welfare treatment standards. Ultimately, the recommended model should be the approach
that best balances bureaucracy with democracy and efficiency with responsiveness.
What follows is an examination of the role of the initiative and referendum
process in American politics and state-level humane livestock standard legislation; a
discussion of how industry regulation is developed; a look at the processes and major
political players in multiple states’ debate over farm animal welfare policy (including
1

economic, public and special interest groups); the role of money and the media in direct
democratic institutions; and an examination of how technocratic decision making and
democratic principles might be reconciled through the use of participatory problem
setting, collaborative network management, and direct democracy. A closer look at how
states have balanced public expectations of the initiative process, pressure for humane
livestock standards, agricultural industry interests, and the impact of farm economic
policy can inform Ohio’s approach, and that of other states, to the development of
livestock treatment standards at the state level. Additionally, states facing future direct
democracy actions regarding the issue of humane livestock standards or exploring
prescriptive political action in response to the growing pressure for such standards may
find the recommendation of a model or “best practice” for defining and implementing
regulatory standards that address the complicated subject useful.
In particular, the focus of this paper is Ohio’s approach to developing humane
livestock standards in comparison to other states who faced the issue before or
simultaneously to Ohio. In some states, a ballot initiative was used to amend the state
constitution to include minimum livestock standards, while in other states a popular
initiative created laws defining minimum livestock housing standards. In a few states,
the legislature took action to create standards. Still, in other states, lawmakers and
interest groups worked together to avoid a ballot initiative that would likely prove costly
for both sides of the issue. Ohio’s approach to discussing and developing humane
livestock standards seems to have borrowed from previous states’ approaches, but the
process it has ended up with appears to be a collaborative engagement of multiple
interested parties in discussions to develop more comprehensive standards than the states
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who tackled the issue before it by addressing more than just housing standards. After
power plays by the agricultural establishment, working with the legislature and the
governor’s office, to preempt a popular initiative spearheaded by the Humane Society of
the United States, the Ohio public approved a legislative referendum in 2009 to create a
body to review Ohio’s livestock care standards and develop news ones where necessary.
But in 2010, after the Humane Society demonstrated it had the popular support to win a
fall initiative campaign forcing the Ohio Livestock Care Standards Board to adopt certain
standards, the governor’s policy advisor for agricultural policy stepped in to mediate
discussions between Ohio’s agricultural establishment and the Humane Society. What
resulted from those discussions was an agreement between all parties to ask the board to
consider the issues most pertinent to the ballot initiative first and to give the board time to
develop meaningful, comprehensive standards without the continually renewed threat of
a ballot initiative. Ohio’s path to a functioning, focused Livestock Care Standards Board
had many twists and turns, but the board, which includes a multitude of interests in the
discussion and has the time it needs to develop comprehensive standards, may be the best
model yet for other states who face the complicated issue of defining what standards are
or are not acceptable for the rearing of livestock in their states.
Chapter 1 of this thesis will examine the literature underpinning the role of
interest groups, technocrats and bureaucrats in rulemaking, regulation and direct
democracy. Chapter 2 examines the politics and processes behind the creation of humane
farm animal welfare standards, paying particular attention to Florida, Arizona, Oregon,
California, Colorado and Michigan. A detailed analysis of Ohio’s approach to farm
animal welfare policy development follows in Chapter 3, while recommendations for
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improving upon Ohio’s process in public administration attempts to define minimum
standards agriculture and other regulated industries are presented in Chapter 4.

FARM ANIMAL WELFARE POLICY TODAY
Starting in 2002, the Humane Society of the United States began supporting
citizen-led legislative efforts, usually by way of the initiative, that not only called for
more humane livestock standards in the raising of animals used for food, but defined
specific limitations on the care of farm animals. In 2002, Florida passed the “Animal
Cruelty Amendment” to the state constitution.∗ No state faced a similar issue until 2006,
when the Humane Society again backed an initiative in Arizona. In 2007, the legislature
in Oregon adopted farm animal welfare legislation; however, since the passage of 2008’s
Proposition 2 in California, the movement has expanded rapidly. Colorado took up the
issue in 2008; Georgia, South Carolina, Massachusetts, Maine, Michigan and Ohio in
2009; and Oklahoma, West Virginia, Indiana, Missouri, Nebraska, South Dakota,
Kentucky, Vermont, and Rhode Island in 2010 (AgRights Coalition; DVM
Newsmagazine February 5, 2010). The growth in the number of states dealing with the
issue has also prompted the re-introduction of federal farm animal welfare legislation
(U.S. Congress March 2, 2010).
Public opinion surveys revealing a growing preference for humanely raised food
seem to indicate public support for farm animal welfare legislation and policy (Lusk, et

Interestingly, the verbiage of the 2002 Florida constitutional amendment specifically says the amendment
is being adopted “to prevent cruelty to animals and as recommended by The Humane Society of the United
States” (italics added). To date, no other legislation, initiative or referendum about farm animal welfare has
credited HSUS with sponsoring the legislation, preferring to focus on the efforts of state-level political
action committees dedicated to the issue.
∗
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al., August 17, 2007; Rauch and Sharp, January 2005). Interest groups have used
preferences expressed in those surveys to call for improved livestock treatment standards
and farm animal welfare policies at the state level despite the potential problems such
policies might bring to the agricultural economic market, an identified lack of replicable
scientific support for improved welfare standards, debate over the validity of research
that does exist, and inertia from policymakers at the federal level. Yet the public interest
group-led movement for more humane livestock standards seems to be gaining
momentum. The tension among the economics of farm animal welfare policies, the
change in value preferences such policies imply, a reliance on scientific data to support
policy changes, and the friction between democratic principles and the appearance of
them creates a dramatic policy making field where institutions, processes, groups, and
individuals can greatly influence the kind of policy adopted and the public’s reaction to
it. The number of unknowns in the field of farm animal welfare as they pertain to
economic demand, scientific support, and legislators’ willingness to act allows interest
groups on either side of the debate to use their resources to influence the creation of
legislation and regulations and the scope of policy solutions considered – using the
initiative process, traditional lobbying techniques to call for referenda, and testimony and
informal feedback during rulemaking proceedings.

DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES
Two basic kinds of direct democracy will be referred to throughout this paper: the
initiative and the referendum. An initiative is the process when citizens propose a law,
usually through signed petition, and the entire electorate votes on that law. A
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referendum, on the other hand, generally starts in the legislature and is voted on by the
electorate before becoming law (Magleby 1994, 219; Matsusaka 2005, 158; Lupia and
Matsusaka 2004, 465). The initiative and referendum were introduced to the American
political landscape during the Progressive Era and populist movement as
countermeasures to what many citizens and citizen advocacy groups viewed as economic
interest influence and control over legislative bodies, which made them less than truly
representative. And some scholars argue that the initiative is “the most important
innovation in direct democracy…because it broke the legislature’s monopoly over the
agenda” (Matsusaka 2005, 159). The direct democracy institutional procedures were
designed to give access and influence to groups, including private citizens, who were
normally excluded from legislative discussions by powerful interest groups with
legislative agendas (Bowler and Donovan 1998, 4; Braunstein 2004, 2).
In the United States, initiatives come in four basic forms: statutory, constitutional,
direct and indirect (Magleby 1994, 219). A statutory initiative can best be described as
citizens drafting laws, and is the kind of initiative most relevant to this study. The
constitutional initiative has also been used in the push for farm animal welfare policy and
occurs when citizens draft constitutional amendments, which happened in Florida.
Statutory and constitutional amendments can also be direct, the process by which a
proposed law goes directly to the ballot for voters to decide, or indirect, when the
legislature is the recipient of the proposed law or constitutional amendment and can
consider adopting it.
The referendum is more closely linked to traditional legislation and takes one of
three forms: petition or popular, advisory, and legislative. The petition or popular
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referendum actually originates with the public and, by petition, is placed on the ballot to
attempt to reverse a legislative decision. The advisory referendum is the process by which
a law is put before voters to gauge public opinion, but the legislature is not bound by the
results of such an election. The legislative referendum is a process, required in some
states, whereby a legislature must place a measure before voters. Often these referenda
deal with the issuance of bonds or constitutional amendments (Matsusaka 2005, 158;
Lupia and Matsusaka 2004, 465). In Ohio, 2009’s Issue 2, which created the Ohio
Livestock Care Standards Board, was a legislative referendum dealing with a
constitutional amendment, submitted to the electorate for approval.
South Dakota was the first state to adopt the initiative and referendum as political
institutions and in 1904, Oregon became the first state to have an initiative appear on the
ballot (Boehmke 2005, 17). As of 2001, 49 of the 50 U.S. states allow legislative
referenda and more than half (27) allow statewide initiatives or popular referendum
(Craig et al. 2001, 26). The frequency with which the initiative and referendum has been
used has ebbed and flowed since the late 1800s.

DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN PRACTICE
Since the 1970s, direct democracy in the United States has experienced a
resurgence (Craig, Kreppel and Kane 2001, 29-30 and 37) and political scientists have
noted that it has important indirect effects. Direct democracy impacts how policy
decisions and discussions are dispersed across state lines (policy diffusion) and how
state-level concerns are raised to the national policy agenda (Bowler and Donovan 1998,
3; McDonagh 1992, 946). Much of the literature on the effects of direct democracy stress
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how the option of using the initiative or referendum changes legislative behavior. As
Gerber points out, “the fact that interest groups have the ability to challenge legislative
policy ex post means that legislators in states that have initiatives must always be aware
of the possibility of future initiative proposals” (1996, 124). In practice, this ever-present
threat can play out in a few ways for legislators.
One indirect effect of direct democratic processes is that the threat of an initiative
or referendum can pressure legislatures to create policies that “reflect majority opinion”
(Mendelsohn and Parkin 2001, 12). Lupia and Matsusaka explain this phenomenon more
clearly, highlighting direct democracy’s “median-reverting” quality and emphasizing that
the referendum and initiative can be used to push “policy back toward the center of
public opinion when legislatures move too far to the right or left” (2004, 474). In
particular, they highlight the initiative’s popularity among fiscal and social conservatives
because of its influence in driving policy toward more conservative ends than would have
otherwise occurred in recent American history (Lupia and Matsusaka 2004, 474).
However, James Madison’s essays during the drafting of the U.S. Constitution warn of
the power of the majority (Madison 1961). Some scholars of direct democracy warn that
“median outcomes may not always be a good thing,” particularly when median outcomes
as defined by the majority threaten “the rights of the minority” (Lupia and Matsasuka
2004, 479).
The threat of direct democracy can also make the legislature as a whole and
legislators individually more responsive to lobbying efforts (Boehmke 2005, 141). The
threat of an initiative might also encourage the legislature to respond to special interests
in an attempt to avoid an initiative campaign (Lupia and Matsusaka 2004, 477). To avoid
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future initiatives, which can be costly, or to preempt interest groups threatening them,
legislators may be more willing to discuss or introduce possible legislation in response to
one side or the other of a potential initiative campaign. These indirect effects of direct
democracy deserve highlighting as they can be the exact opposite of the intent of citizen
access direct democracy processes: Instead of giving those who normally lack access to
the political process a way to have their voices heard, some special interest groups with
access could use the threat of an initiative to strengthen the influence and access they
already possess. The indirect effects direct democracy – legislative responsiveness to
special interest groups – may actually strengthen special interest influence in the lawmaking process in some cases instead of protecting the majority opinion or the public
interest by providing public interest groups greater access.
Pitting the two forms of direct democracy against each other, referenda can also
be used to preempt initiatives or the initiative process (Gerber 1996, 101) and,
symbolically, to gain greater political legitimacy for a decision than another procedural
process might provide (Mendelsohn and Parkin 2001, 10). Ohio’s legislative referendum
to create the board preempted the initiative the Humane Society indicated it might pursue
in Ohio. The verbiage that appeared on Ohio ballots in November 2009 painted a strong
symbolic picture for voters, ensuring them that the legislature was serious about
protecting Ohio agriculture. The fact that the General Assembly chose to pursue a
referendum to amend the state’s constitution instead of simply creating the board, via its
statutory authority, perhaps under the Department of Agriculture, may have also been a
symbolic maneuver, designed to gain greater legitimacy (through widespread public
approval) for an idea developed and lobbied for by large producers and agriculture
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commodity groups in the state. Ohio’s use of direct democracy to develop humane
livestock standards is no exception; many states have created standards using the
initiative and referendum.

CRITIQUES OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY
Direct democracy is not without its critics. Some critics feel legislators are better
informed and can make better decisions because of debate and discussion that flow from
involvement in committees and forums (Bowler and Donovan 1998, 11). Other critics
emphasize the American public’s apparent lack of enthusiasm for political involvement:
The last thing people want is to be more involved in political decision
making: They do not want to make political decisions themselves; they do
not want to provide much input to those who are assigned to make these
decisions; and they would rather not know all the details of the decisionmaking process. (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002, 1-2)
Still other critics highlight that, by forcing voters to choose between a series of unrelated
policy questions, direct democracy does not allow the public to express priorities among
issues (Clark 1998). For example, in the case of humane farm animal treatment
standards, direct democracy does not permit a voter to prioritize between having
humanely raised food and having food that he or she can actually afford to purchase.
Instead, voters are simply asked whether or not they prefer animals raised for food or
other animal products be treated humanely, without regard to the cost such treatment may
add to the consumer’s purchase price.
Perhaps the most scathing critique of direct democratic institutions, however, is
that the institutions do not protect against the power of well-organized, well-funded
interest groups as intended. Braunstein concludes “organized interest groups have greater
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access to the resources necessary to both initiate and win…campaigns than unorganized
citizen groups” (2004, 5). Magleby takes Braunstein’s critique one step farther, outlining
the implications of limited access to the initiative and referendum processes:
Citizen participation in direct legislation in most states is confined largely
to voting on measures put on the ballot with the assistance of the initiative
industry and to responding to the campaigns financed by a few individuals
or groups willing to make large contributions. (1994, 245)
Certainly, whether or not an initiative or referendum makes it to the ballot is dependent
upon gathering enough signatures by determined deadlines, but these authors argue that
the success of signature gathering efforts is often dependent on how many resources can
be invested in signature gatherers, media and marketers (Broder 2000, 52; Braunstein
2004, 5; Magleby 1994, 245). As one journalist points out after researching the initiative
industry in California, “government by initiative is…a big business in which…firms and
other players sell their services to affluent interest groups or millionaire do-gooders with
private policy and political agendas” (Broder 2000, 5).
In fact, an industry has grown up around the popularity of the initiative.
According to Magleby, the initiative industry is the “expansion and professionalization”
of initiative campaigns through the use of “professional managers, petition circulators,
media consultants, pollsters…” who are involved in getting measures on the ballot, but
just as importantly, are running the campaigns for and against initiative measures both in
the legislative branch and the legal system (1994, 234-235). The power of the initiative
industry becomes more important when its resources – financial, human and temporal –
are combined with the influence of American media. Initiative ballot issues can be
controversial, which means that coverage of initiative issues sells (Magleby 1994, 236).
Initiative industry media professionals know how to capitalize on such controversy to
11

drive the campaign in one direction or another. For example, in Ohio, much of the media
coverage of Issue 2 focused on “outsiders” coming into Ohio to tell Ohioans how to
manage its biggest industry – agriculture – or on the perceived “power grab” by the
agricultural industry vice the small, family farmer. In reality, the issue is much more
complicated, involving aspects of the local food movement, food security and safety, and
the impacts of adding stringent regulation to an often struggling segment of the economy.
If the initiative process is not safe from the influences of interest groups with
money, people and time, the referendum process may not be immune either. According
to Mendelsohn and Parkin,
…in theory, referendums (sic) are designed to permit citizens to make
decisions about public policy, but in practice referendums (sic) are used
strategically by governments or groups seeking not to turn decision
making over to citizens, but to persuade voters to ratify the position
favored by the referendum’s sponsor. (2001, 2)
It may be that, in the United States today, the direct democracy process is just as
corrupted by power, influence and money as the legislative process was perceived to have
been during the Progressive Era. As one journalist noted,
what the founders never could have foreseen…was the growth of a
lucrative initiative industry, in which a variety of firms make handsome
profits from drafting the language, collecting the signatures, managing the
campaigns, and creating the media that result in the passage or defeat of
these ballot measures. (Broder 2000, 17)
In Broder’s estimation, the success or failure of an initiative campaign depends as much
on the power and resources behind the campaign as the actual issue itself.
Still, the exact nature of the role of money in the initiative process may not be
what most think it is. As Daniel Smith points out, “reflecting on the past century, it
becomes fairly clear that the initiative process in American states has not been any more
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immune from the influence of money than our representative system of government”
(2010, 44). He further notes that economic interests routinely spend more on ballot
measures than traditional lobbying of state legislatures (Smith 2010, 44). However,
whether or not and how spending on campaigns actually affects the outcomes of initiative
campaigns remains unclear (Smith 2010, 52). According to Smith’s summary of the
research regarding campaign spending on ballot initiatives, many studies conclude “that
one-sided spending had little impact when done in support of a measure, but was almost
always successful in defeating a ballot measure” (2010, 52-53), while other studies
demonstrate that “controlling for media and elite endorsements of measures, …[for] 17 of
32 campaigns for which polling data were available, the initial preferences of voters
shifted toward the direction of the side spending more money” (2010, 53). Still other
scholars have argued “higher campaign expenditures do not lead to ballot success”
(Smith 2010, 53).
Part of what makes determining the impact of campaign spending on ballot
measures difficult is the legal framework in which campaign finances must be disclosed.
Smith highlights that, not only do “campaign finance disclosure laws…vary across
states” (2010, 42), but on multiple occasions federal courts have struck down state laws
that attempted “to rein in campaign financing of ballot measures” (2010, 49). Federal
courts have apparently argued that public disclosure of campaign contributions is enough
to protect “the integrity of the political system” (Smith 2010, 49), despite the fact that
“the sizeable sums spent by proponents and opponents prior to a measure’s qualification”
are “not a matter of public record” (Smith 2010, 57).
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AFTER ELECTION DAY: IMPLEMENTING INITIATIVES AND REFERENDA
The policy process does not end for proponents of direct democracy after Election
Day. As Edelman points out “what people get from government is what administrators
do about their problems rather than the promises of statutes, constitutions, or oratory”
(Edelman 1985, 193), while Berry notes “if an interest group is to maximize its
effectiveness, it must be skilled in lobbying the executive branch as well” (Berry 1997,
168). The ultimate impact and meaning of a policy depends upon how it is implemented.
Because citizens must yield some power to government actors during the implementation
process, winning ballot issues resulting from direct democracy are generally
compromises, to some extent, between what the public envisioned and what government
actors want (Gerber et al. 2001, 109-110; Lupia and Matsusaka 2004, 467). Because
policy must be implemented after legislation is approved, groups who are successful in
getting their initiative passed must continue to advocate throughout the implementation
process since politicians or bureaucrats may desire minimizing an initiative’s effect
through how it is administered or because effects must be minimized to reach a politically
acceptable solution (Boehmke 2005, 22).
Rulemaking is part of the process by which legislation is implemented and is
accomplished by bureaucratic institutions. As Kerwin and Furlong point out,
“rulemaking stands between the enactment of a law by Congress and the realization of
the goals that both Congress and the people it represents seek to achieve by that law”
(2011, 2). One of the primary reasons the legislative branch yields rulemaking authority
to the executive branch is that it does not possess the information or the time necessary to
develop sound rules. Thus, bureaucratic agencies are given latitude to seek out the
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information they need from industry, “in-house research offices,” public interest groups
and “outside experts” (Kerwin and Furlong 2011, 102). As the source of the expertise
and information rulemakers need, such special and public interest groups can influence
the kind of rules developed, and ultimately, the effectiveness of legislative goals. And
these groups understand that influence. According to Kerwin and Furlong’s fourth
edition of Rulemaking: How Government Agencies Write Law and Make Policy, just over
75 percent of the interest groups they surveyed said involvement in the rulemaking
process was as important or more important than lobbying Congress (2011, 193).
The need for continued organization and resources often creates more stress on
citizen groups and public interest groups than economic groups or special interest groups.
According to Lupia and Matsusaka, organizations that are successful in passing initiatives
often disband after elections (2004, 476). Interestingly, a lack of resources following
election day and quick disbanding after “winning” may mean that the post-election day
implementation phase of direct democracy favors organizations with “staying power” and
resources to do so – the very special interest groups direct democracy was intended to
help counterbalance through citizen access to the policy agenda and legislative process.
For example, after Issue 2 passed in November 2009, the Ohio General Assembly was
required to pass implementing legislation to clarify certain aspects of the Ohio Livestock
Care Standards Board’s authority, its funding, term limits, replacement appointments, and
meeting requirements. After Substitute House Bill 414, the implementing legislation,
was signed in late March 2010, the board members were appointed and began holding
“listening sessions” for public input and prioritizing among the numerous livestock care
issues they were anticipated to address (Ohio Department of Agriculture News Release,
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April 30, 2010). According to the meeting minute notes summarizing the June 1, 2010,
the Ohio Livestock Care Standards Board meeting, more than 700 people attended the six
listening sessions, with 142 people providing oral comments; those who commented
included producers, economic interest groups, consumers and humane society
representatives (Ohio Livestock Care Standards Board Meeting Minutes June 1, 2010).
And as the board meeting minutes from June 15 to November 2, 2010, reveal,
approximately 13 of 38 public oral and written comments came from “big agriculture”
interest group representatives and 13 more comments came from representatives from
“alternative agriculture” or public interest groups involved in the discussions. Only 12,
or one-third, of the public comments came from people who did not identify themselves
primarily as members or representatives of a specific group (Appendix D). Interest
groups, whether public or special, with the resources to continue to engage lawmakers
and policy makers during the post-election phase of initiative implementation have
continued influence on the results of the “compromise” between the vision of the
initiative and the reality of it.
Olson offers a slightly different interpretation of why certain interest groups have
more resources, and motivation, to remain active in trying to influence policy
implementation after election day has passed. According to him, the public is, as a
whole, a large, latent group while business, or special, interests are privileged groups
(Olson 1965). He stresses that “large or latent groups will not organize for coordinated
action merely because, as a group, they have a reason for doing so” (Olson 1965, 65), and
that “smaller groups will frequently be able voluntarily to organize and act in support of
their common interests” (Olson 1965, 127). The result of this imbalance between large
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and small groups’ abilities to organize and act in a coordinated fashion means “the
outcome of the political struggle among the various groups in society will not be
symmetrical” (Olson 1965, 127). In other words, the post-election day influence on
policy implementation favors smaller groups who are able to become and stay organized,
often private or special interest groups, instead of large interest groups, like the general
public, who are largely latent and have difficulty becoming and remaining organized to
influence policy decisions.

INTEREST GROUPS AND DIRECT DEMOCRACY
While Berry and Fischer seem to imply that public interest group access to the
policy process can help balance democracy and bureaucracy, the U.S. institutions most
commonly thought to provide access to those groups may be less democratic than
originally intended. The access and influence that knowledge, power and money afford
individuals and groups seems inescapable in the modern American democracy, even at
the state level and perhaps in direct democracy processes. In the United States,
Edelman’s observations that “the most cherished forms of popular participation in
government are largely symbolic” and “that many of the public programs universally
taught and believed to benefit the mass public in fact benefit relatively small groups”
could apply to the initiative and referendum processes (1985, 4). During the Progressive
Era, industrialists and trade associations organized and pushed for legislation favorable to
their industries and the economics of their business sectors (Braunstein 2004, 18; Kolko
1963, 180). Today, special interests, including trade associations and industry groups,
citizen groups, and good governance groups organize and push for legislation favorable
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to their cause – sometimes using traditional legislative procedures and sometimes using
state-level direct democracy processes. Success in some states only drives groups to
want more success in other states, through the expansion of benefits and demands or
through pushing to get similar measures on other states’ ballots (Edelman 1985, 193;
Magleby 1994, 238-239).
In the agricultural policy arena, Luther Tweeten, professor emeritus of
agricultural marketing trade and policy in the Department of Agricultural, Environmental,
and Developmental Economics at The Ohio State University, advocates the agricultural
industry preempting citizen groups by pushing for legislative or policy action in an
attempt to self-regulate (1993, 102). In his estimation, a failure to act preemptively could
force farmers and agricultural groups to abide by more onerous regulations forced upon
them by “alternative interest groups” with “little clout with agricultural committees” who
are forced to “use the media to influence public opinion” (Tweeten 1993, 102 and 99). In
other words, organized, powerful special interests should act within more traditional
legislative processes, where they have more influence than citizen groups, to prevent the
possible future use of the initiative to create restrictive legislation or policy. In Ohio,
agricultural interests worked with the legislature to preempt the threat of an initiative
largely perceived as funded by “outside interests” by placing a legislative referendum to
amend the state’s constitution on the November 2009 ballot for voters’ consideration
(Advent October 2010; Stimpert October 2010; Minton November 2010). In this way,
Ohio legislators were able to preempt the use of one form of direct democracy (the
initiative) by using another form of it (the referendum). Preemptive action by industrial
economic interest groups and legislatures may sound like a questionable political game,
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but some scholars suggests that it has happened before in American history (Kolko 1963;
Braunstein 2004). Indeed, industry is often home to the expertise the executive and
legislative branches of government need to make sound policy decisions and to
accurately characterize potential outcomes, making agency capture a possibility.
However, agency capture by special interests is not unavoidable. Using problem setting
and collaborative management techniques, intentionally involving a wide variety of
opinions and voices in bureaucratic decisions, agency capture can be mitigated.

TECHNOCRATS AND INTEREST GROUPS: SHAPING PUBLIC POLICY
Special interest, bureaucratic and expert influence on the policy process cannot be
ignored, especially after election day when policy implementation and rulemaking begin
in earnest. One could characterize the influence of individuals with specialized
knowledge as a kind of “elite” control of public policy. Fischer posits something similar:
that the United States has developed into a “technocratic” state, where a reliance on
expert knowledge and scientific decision making in defining policy options limits
meaningful democratic participation in governance (1990, 171 and 21) and sustains
“increasingly undemocratic forms of decision making” (1990, 14). Fischer relies on Jean
Meynuad’s definition of technocracy, which he summarizes as “a system of governance
in which technically trained experts rule by virtue of their specialized knowledge and
position in dominant political and economic institutions” (1990, 17). Technocrats, as
experts in fields such as animal science or agricultural economics that are relevant to the
issue of livestock care standards, can greatly sway public policy decisions by limiting
policy options, providing evidence or argumentation in favor of one policy option or
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another, or because they often become “intermediaries between…decision makers and
the groups toward which specific policies are aimed” (Fischer 1990, 171). By limiting
the kind and number of options available, the public policy process becomes less
democratic and more elite – a smaller cadre of experts are left to make policy decisions
about complicated topics because the public is presumed not to have the necessary
understanding of the policy issue (which is sometimes, if not often, the case). In the case
of Ohio, the Livestock Care Standards Board and its subcommittees can be considered a
semi-technocratic group. Many of the people selected to be on the board and the species
subcommittees have both academic degrees in animal agriculture, grew up raising
animals on farms, and are now animal farmers. Three of the board members are licensed
veterinarians, while others are considered knowledgeable in animal welfare and food
insecurity issues in the state. Still, most of the board members would not claim to be
“experts” in their field. Instead, they might describe themselves as “experienced.” Thus,
Ohio’s Livestock Care Standards Board combines both technocrats and bureaucrats,
which seems to find a balance between technocratic decision making based strictly on
science and decision making taking into consideration public and special interest group
opinion by intentionally bringing these groups’ opinions into the discussion.
The danger of technocratic governance, as Fischer points, goes beyond the
potential threat to democratic institutions that technocratic decision making poses. In his
opinion, in a technocracy, “governance becomes less a matter of determining the
appropriate direction for society than one of adjusting its institutions and policies to the
flows of economic and technological developments” (Fischer 1990, 15-16). In short,
technocracies seem to minimize or ignore the values, or shifts in values, underlying
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policy decisions or pressure for policy changes. Dickson agrees, articulating that
scientific approaches -- specifically cost-benefit analyses popular in many policy fields -to “political questions of equality, justice, power, and social welfare” ignore values,
ethics and morals (Dickson 1984, 286). The minimization of these values is in many
ways unintentional, with the people making policy recommendations assuming public
values are in line with technical analysis’ emphasis on positivism (Fischer 1990, 48, 49,
317). Nor is the minimization of these values always possible. While technocratic
experts may have a tendency to rely on scientific approaches like cost-benefit analyses,
their policy decisions must still be made in context of contemporary concerns. Interest
groups, with access to both the experts and bureaucrats involved in decision making, are
likely to provide that context.
To alleviate the threat to democracy that technocratic approaches to government
embody, both Fischer and Berry argue that the number and kind of groups brought into
policy discussions should be intentionally broadened (Fischer 1990; Berry 1977). Berry
recognizes the legitimacy of public interest groups and feels the government should
“encourage and ease the participation” of such groups (Berry 1977, 291, 292), in order to
ensure a broader spectrum of opinions and interests is involved in policy making, whether
from the legislature, the executive branch, or bureaucratic rulemaking institutions. He is
careful to articulate that economic interest groups should not be afforded the same access
as a public interest group as “one that seeks a collective good, the achievement of which
will not selectively or materially benefit the membership or activists of the organization”
(Berry 1977, 7). Fischer calls his approach to including more voices in the policy process
as “problem setting” and proposes that more emphasis in policy circles be placed on
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defining the policy problem and identifying the values underlying possible solutions
(Fischer 1990, 371). It is exactly the role of social movements, commonly carried into
the political arena by public interest groups, to establish new institutions and shape the
values underpinning society and public policy (Fischer 1990, 361).
Like encouraging the involvement of public interest groups in rule- and policy
making, the involvement of bureaucrats in technocratic decision making may also
actually protect democratic institutions. According to Fritschler, “the existence in
America of a bureaucracy with policy-making powers assures a more broadly
representative decision-making process than one that relies solely on a legislature (1996,
150). In part, the involvement of bureaucrats in policy making means greater
representation of a broader range of public opinions because the bureaucracy is, itself,
more representative of the public at large than the legislature. The involvement of
bureaucrats in policy making also provides people and groups interested in influencing
policy “an alternative route to influence” (Fritschler 1996, 143) and “opportunities for
and dimensions to public participation that are rarely present in deliberations of Congress
or other legislatures” (Kerwin and Furlong 2011, 31).
In the case of the Ohio Livestock Care Standards Board, the roles of technocrat
and bureaucrat have been delegated to the members of the board, who were chosen for
their expertise as farmers, producers, consumers, animal welfare activists, veterinarians,
and department of agriculture employees. Five of the board’s 13 members have
advanced degrees in veterinary science or agricultural administration; 2 of the board’s
members represent organic farming interests; 4 members, some of whom also hold
degrees in animal science or veterinary medicine, represent agricultural industry interests;
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2 board members come from public interest groups; and 2 board members have degrees
or extensive experience in public administration (Appendix C). A similar inclusion of
various interests and expertise has been included in the board’s subcommittees. Because
of the diversity of the board and subcommittee members, and because much of the
board’s decision making has yet to happen, and rules are likely not to take effect for
years, whether the technocrats and bureaucrats involved in developing Ohio’s livestock
care standards are creating neutral, public-serving regulations or industry-favoring
regulations remains to be seen. However, one can be certain that some board members,
seemingly outside the political and bureaucratic elite circles, are not sure how or why
they were chosen to be board members (Atherton 2010), and that the board and its
subcommittees provides ample opportunity for public input, comment, consent and
feedback during its listening sessions and regular public comment periods, and through
its electronic comment submissions.◊

GOVERNMENT REGULATION AND REGULATED INDUSTRIES
Since the end of the 19th century, the government has become increasingly
involved in regulating private industry. Kunkel describes regulation as the
“governmental effort to limit the choices available to individuals within the framework of
a democratic society,” either through coercive measures or through a system of incentives
(2000, 75). Although school children across America are taught that the Progressive Era
and its accompanying regulation of industry grew out government concern over the

◊

There is some indication that the board does consider public comments. Indeed, creating a means through
which the public can electronically submit comments and questions to the board was a suggestion made
during the May 2010 listening sessions before the board’s work had begun in earnest. The effectiveness of
the public comment opportunities will be addressed in Chapter 3.
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growing monopolies in key industries and safety concerns for industrial workers, an
alternative interpretation of historical events is possible. Kolko suggests government
regulation was often initiated by regulated industries to limit the potential destructiveness
of an increasingly competitive business environment by forcing order into the economic
arena (1963). Other scholars have acknowledged that Progressive Era reforms may have
served the needs of businessmen using government for their own purposes (Braunstein
2004, 3) and that regulatory policies generally are not pursued unless the regulated
groups find the proposed regulations acceptable (Edelman 1985, 24).
Edelman and Kolko both highlight the relationship between regulator and
regulated. During the Progressive Era, and to an extent probably today, political leaders
believed industry, as the experts in a given field, should have some say in the regulations
to govern their businesses (Kolko 1963, 283). Regulating industry often meant, and still
means, the creation of independent commissions charged with enforcing and sometimes
developing restrictions and incentives. Edelman points out that it is these bureaucratic
commissions’ very independence that makes them “tools of the groups they regulate”
(1985, 43). Kolko sheds further light on the subject:
Bureaucracy, in itself, needed a power base in order to operate in a
roughly continuous, systematic fashion. Since it had no economic power
itself, it had to support, and hence be supported by, powerful economic
groups. This was especially true…where the idea of bureaucracy
originated with those operating in the very area in which the bureaucracy
was to function. (Kolko 1964, 303)
The regulators needed the support of the regulated to enforce any policies, since the
regulators were without true power to restrict actions or create incentives.
In the agricultural policy arena, federal regulation of the meat packing industry
serves as an example to demonstrate the link between regulator and regulated. Inspection
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of meat packing facilities was initiated long before Upton Sinclair’s The Jungle in 1906.
In the 1880s, large meat packers initiated the reforms with the Department of Agriculture
in an effort to improve exports to Europe, an interest of the meat packers, not necessarily
the American public. Legislation in 1891 did not satisfy meat packers either: smaller
meat packers were excluded from government regulation, giving them a competitive edge
in the American market, so larger meat packers lobbied to extend the inspection law. In
1906, the House of Representatives passed the Beveridge Amendment to expand
regulation to small meat packers and to further increase American packers’ export status
(Kolko 1964). Certainly, the federal government had some interest in regulating the
industry to ensure the safety of American consumers, but the driving force behind
regulation of the meat packing industry was the packers’ efforts to create favorable,
equitable economic conditions across continents and regardless of the size of one’s
packing enterprise.
A more recent example of the close relationship between special interests and the
government bodies that regulate them is the relationship between the oil industry and the
Minerals Management Service. After the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill in 2010, the
Minerals Management Service under the Department of the Interior was reorganized to
“address claims that the current organization…fosters weaknesses in the MMS regulatory
actions” (Congressional Research Service June 18, 2010, 32). The concern was that the
Minerals Management Service managed both the operational and revenue aspects of the
outer continental shelf leasing program, which created a conflict of interest for the
Minerals Management Service that business interests could exploit to their advantage
(Congressional Research Service June 18, 2010, 32).
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Government regulation of industry is a way for the government to secure benefits
for a group of people. American citizens are encouraged to believe that the regulations
provide benefits to the public in general, and in many cases, they do. But what if the
benefits actually affect a smaller subset of the public while only serving to placate the
general public?
Administrative agencies are to be understood as economic and political
instruments of the parties they regulate and benefit, not of a reified
‘society,’ ‘general will,’ or ‘public interest.’ At the same time, they
perform this instrumental function, they…create and sustain an impression
that induces acquiescence of the public in the face of the private tactics
that might otherwise be expected to produce resentment, protest, and
resistance. (Edelman 1985, 56)
Government regulations can, and do, protect the public at large, but in some instances,
regulations also protect certain segments of society or business from competition. In
these instances, regulation can serve a symbolic purpose: placating the general public by
making them feel good about the regulation while masking that the regulation actually
benefits a small segment of society. The same can be said of direct democracy. In some
cases, direct democracy may enable the public to inform policy debates and secure policy
decisions favorable to its general will; in other cases, it may be that direct democracy
provides interest groups a process through which they can achieve their own goals while
making the public feel good about it.

26

II. SETTING THE SCENE FOR HUMANE LIVESTOCK STANDARDS
IN OHIO
Some authors define animal welfare as general health of the animal and “what the
animal wants” (Dawkins 2006, 78). Webster provides a bit more clarity about what
animal welfare means: an animal’s “ability to sustain fitness and avoid suffering” (2001,
229). Webster’s definition implies that good farm animal welfare policy will protect both
an animal’s physical and mental well-being:
the phrase “sustain fitness” implies physical welfare; e.g. freedom from
disease, injury and incapacity, and this acquires particular importance
when these problems can be directly attributed to the conditions in which
the animals are reared. The expression “avoid suffering” refers to mental
welfare. (Webster 2001, 232)
Federal regulation in the United States addresses farm animals’ physical and mental wellbeing during rearing only tangentially. Certainly, federal regulation addresses the food
safety issues of allowing downer livestock into food supplies, but for the most part,
federal regulation of animal welfare has avoided directing how farmers must treat
livestock while they are being reared. Instead, federal regulation of animal welfare
pertains to shipping standards, slaughter standards, and animal research standards
(Tweeten 1993, 95). The inability or unwillingness of the federal government to address
humane livestock standards on the farm is likely influenced by the power the traditional
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agricultural establishment (Table 1) has over legislators on agricultural committees
(Tweeten 1993, 87).θ Key members of the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition
Table 1. Agricultural Establishment
General farm organizations
Commodity organizations
Individual farmers
Agribusiness (private & cooperative) Output processing and marketing firms
Input supply firms
Agricultural media
Government & Government Agencies Farm-state governments
Agricultural committees in Congress
U.S. Department of Agriculture
Land-grant agricultural colleges
Source: Tweeten 1993, 89
Producers

and Forestry received roughly 10 percent of their campaign contributions from
agricultural or agriculture-related industries between 2005 and 2010. In the two-year
period of 2009 to 2010, the chairman and the ranking minority member of the House
Agriculture Committee received more than 35 percent of their campaign contributions
from the same industries (Appendix B).
Undoubtedly, creating and enforcing humane livestock standards at the federal
level would be unpopular with the agricultural establishment, whose membership
generally includes the types of organizations and businesses that would be impacted by
the financial burden that such standards would create on an industry already widely
believed to be suffering economically. Government regulations changing how bulk
quantities of animal products are produced will impact the cost of raising livestock for the
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The Prevention of Farm Animal Cruelty Act, House Resolution 4733, was introduced in the U.S. House
of Representatives in March 2010. It requires “Federal agencies to procure food products derived from
certain animals only from sources that raised the animals free from cruelty and abuse, and for other
purposes” (U.S. Congress March 2, 2010). It was referred to the House Subcommittee on Livestock, Dairy
and Poultry in June 2010.
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farmer. The regulations may require farmers to make “substantial changes” to their
farming operation that require capital most farmers do not have and that may impact a
farmer’s ability to sell his goods or force him to employ a more skilled labor force
(Webster 2001, 145). Such was the case in California, according a story published by the
state’s farm bureau, where one egg producer spent $3.2 million dollars to construct one
laying facility that meets all of the state’s 2008 Proposition 2 concerns (Adler July 7,
2010).⊗ The cost of mandated changes can threaten to put farmers out of business and,
ultimately, affect the price consumers pay for livestock-related products.
Still, some agricultural interests consider instituting different, more humane
livestock rearing standards worth the cost. Tweeten calls this disparate group of people
and organizations, a segment of whom advocate animal welfare, animal rights and the
importance of small family farms in lieu of factory farming “alternative agriculture”
(Tweeten 1993, 93).
Part of what makes it difficult for policy makers to create different standards for
farm animal care is that the science behind the pros and cons of specific rearing practices
is often disputed. Croney points out three substantial problems with the scientific
research concerning what improves animal health and what animals want: the research
has been vilified by opponents of farm animal welfare standards, the animal health field
of study is a relatively new discipline with insufficient result replication; and the research
somewhat lacks “transparency in methodology and interpretation of results” (2007, 557).
The unsettled nature behind the science of animal welfare creates a difficult field for

The assumptions and calculations behind this cost estimate are unknown and may be exaggerated to
strengthen the position of the state’s farm bureau, which opposes the changes being mandated. Still, one
can reasonably expect that producers will incur some cost to convert existing facilities to comply with new
standards or to build new production facilities. Some producers will be unable to assume those costs.
⊗
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policy makers wishing to make evidence-based decisions. Especially in the United
States, there is a general desire to make policy decisions based on science (Kunkel 2000,
201; Croney 2007, 561; Lusk and Norwood 2008, 1121), but the science does not always
exist and, if it does, is not always adequately replicated or seems to support one method
of rearing livestock just as much as it supports another.
In those states that recognize the inherent complexity of defining humane
livestock standards without ignoring public sentiment, making food too expensive for
consumers to afford, or decimating the livestock industry, legislators have created boards
or someone has stepped in to encourage, and facilitate, discussions between livestock
producers and humane farming advocates. Other states have chosen to tackle the
problem head on, enacting laws that require farmers and producers to raise animals a
certain way, while other states have chosen to avoid the issue, sometimes enacting
legislation that prevents other jurisdictions from addressing the problem.

BLAZING THE TRAIL FOR FARM ANIMAL WELFARE:
FLORIDA, ARIZONA AND OREGON
Ohio is far from the first state to become involved in detailed, deliberate
discussions about whether or not humane livestock treatment standards should be
adopted, and if so, what they should be. In 2002, Florida became the first state to adopt
farm animal welfare policy. The citizens did so after adopting the “Animal Cruelty
Amendment” to the state constitution. The amendment outlawed the “cruel and inhumane
confinement of pigs during pregnancy” in any way that prevented a sow from “turning
around freely,” except “during the prebirthing process” and when the sow is receiving
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veterinary treatment (Florida Department of State Division of Elections). At the time of
the initiative, the law was expected to impact between 700 and 3,000 sows and only one
or two farms in a state that ranks below 30th in pork production (Kuehn October 1, 2002;
Hinman April 15, 2010).
In 2006, Arizona adopted Proposition 204, the Humane Farming Initiative, which
became the Humane Treatment of Farm Animals Act. The act outlawed the confinement
or tethering of a
pig during pregnancy or any calf raised for veal, on a farm, for all or the
majority of any day, in a manner that prevents such an animal from: 1.
lying down and fully extending his or her limbs; or 2. turning around
freely. (Arizona Revised Statute Section 13-2910.07 – 13-2910.08)
At the time of the initiative, the generally conservative state was home to only one
industrial pork operation (Roosevelt November 6, 2010) and no veal production (Hinman
April 15, 2010; The Arizona Republic October 19, 2010).
A year later, Oregon became the first state whose legislature adopted some form
of farm animal welfare policy. The state’s 2007 Senate Bill 694 banned the confinement
of “a calf or a pig for more than 12 hours during any 24-hour period in a manner that”
restricts the animal’s ability to lie down and fully extend its limbs or turn around freely
(Oregon Legislative Assembly 2007). Much like the initiative in Arizona, the legislation
was specifically aimed at the use of gestation crates (Humane Society of the United
States June 28, 2007), stalls approximately 2 feet by 7 feet used to confine pregnant
breeding sows and generally acknowledged to prevent sows from moving freely, and the
tethering of veal calves. According to the Oregon Farm Bureau – an organization that
opposed the legislation – Oregon was not a large pork producing state, being home to
small family-owned farms that did not use gestation crates (Fiala September 1, 2007),
31

and produced no veal. However, the state’s farm bureau warned that the legislation
would impact Oregon’s dairy industry “by outlawing basic tethering practices that are
used for the well-being of dairy cows” (Fast Spring/Summer 2007).∅
Florida, Arizona and Oregon blazed three different trails to follow as the political
movement to demand humane livestock standards began to expand. Acting within each
state’s legal framework, the three states chose three different political approaches to
instituting standards. Florida recognized the position of the Humane Society and other
animal welfare groups by drafting a constitutional amendment for public approval
(Florida Department of State Division of Elections); Arizona voters recognized the
importance of humane livestock rearing and production through a voter initiative (Farm
Sanctuary). Oregon’s legislature acted within its statutory authority to create minimum
livestock treatment standards (Oregon Legislative Assembly 2007). The agricultural
industries affected in each of these three states were not broad, influential groups (Kuehn
October 1, 2002; Hinman April 15, 2010; Roosevelt November 6, 2010; Fiala September
1, 2007). The measures that created humane livestock standards were probably opposed
by a few groups, but the measures passed with little or no evidence of detrimental impact
because the number of producers they affected, if any, was relatively small in each state.

A MOVEMENT GAINING MOMENTUM: CALIFORNIA
Emboldened by success in Florida and Arizona and unpressured progress in
Oregon, the Humane Society of the United States, a driving force between the initiatives
in Florida and Arizona, and its partners spearheaded the effort to place an initiative on the

The actual impact of Oregon’s legislation on the state’s dairy industry remains undetermined because the
ban on tethering and confinement does not take affect until January 1, 2012.
∅
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ballot for Californian voters in 2008. Proposition 2, adopted as the Prevention of Farm
Animal Cruelty Act with 63 percent of the vote (American Veterinary Medical
Association February 2009), outlaws the confinement or tethering of animals “on a farm,
for all or the majority of any day, in a manner that prevents such animals from: (a) lying
down, standing up, and fully extending his or her limbs; and (b) turning around freely”
(California Health & Safety Code Section 25990-25994). For the first time, because the
ballot initiative covered “farm animals” generally, the use of battery cages, common
housing for egg-laying hens on industrial egg production farms, was prohibited (Lovvorn
and Perry 2009) – in a state that ranks as the fifth-largest egg producer in the United
States (Hinman April 15, 2010).
In June 2008, before the passage of Proposition 204, the University of California
Agricultural Issues Center at the University of California-Davis released a study detailing
the “Economic Effects of Proposed Restriction on Egg-laying Hen Housing in
California.” The study concluded “the impact of the initiative would not affect how eggs
would be produced, only where eggs would be produced” (Sumner et al. July 2008). The
authors stated California, a net importer of shelled eggs, would incur production costs in
non-organic, non-cage systems that were 20 percent higher than in battery cage systems.
Thus, regulation created by Proposition 204 would actually favor out-of-state egg
production and almost eliminate egg production in the state during the six-year
adjustment period granted to producers in the ballot initiative (Sumner et al. July 2008).
The forecasts of the center’s study may never be confirmed. In response to the center’s
predictions, to prevent other states from convincing Californian egg producers to move to
other states (Greene July 8, 2010), or perhaps in an effort to expand humane protections
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for farm animals, California passed Assembly Bill 1437 in 2010, which requires egg
producers who want to sell shelled eggs in California to meet the state’s standards for
humane treatment (California Legislature February 27, 2009).
Like California, Ohio is an important egg-producing state, ranking second in the
nation (Ohio Secretary of State, Profile Ohio). Similar predictions have been made about
how increased housing space for laying hens or cage-free requirements would decimate
the Ohio egg industry. A paper, modeled on Sumner et al.’s study in California and
presented to the Ohio Livestock Care Standards Board in the summer of 2010, by an
undergraduate student in economics at The Ohio State University predicted the end of
egg production in Ohio if egg producers in Ohio were required to convert to cage-free
housing for laying hens. The report predicts production costs would increase 39 percent
for Ohio egg producers; the greater number of cage free eggs would flood the market and
drop the price of such eggs; and out-of-state caged-egg producers would increase
shipments into Ohio, thus all but forcing Ohio egg producers to exit the market (Black
2010, 11). As in California, the standards the Ohio Livestock Care Standards Board
develops may require protective action by the General Assembly. Some might argue that
the board provides a more comprehensive approach to the development of livestock care
standards, but no matter where the standards come from – initiative or board – further
legislative action may be required to protect Ohio producers from out-of-state
competition with lower treatment standards and production costs. When and if standards
defining more restrictive rearing standards are created in Ohio for laying hens and other
livestock, similar protective legislation may become necessary. Both the Ohio Livestock
Care Standards Board and the Ohio General Assembly must remain prepared to manage

34

the secondary effects of implementing humane livestock standards. Indeed, the
regulation of the agricultural industry in any state may require a collaborative relationship
between the bureaucratic agency designing and implementing new rules and the
governing body able to make additional laws necessary to protect the viability of the
livestock industry in any given state.
The importance of the egg industry to the Californian agricultural economy; the
growing interest in humane farm animal treatment due to books, movies and exposés
about industrial agricultural; renewed academic interest in the topic; and the fact that
California’s appeared on the ballot during the same year as a presidential election helped
propel the issue of farm animal welfare legislation and the discussion of humane
treatment of farm animals forward in many states.

COMPROMISE IN COLORADO AND MICHIGAN
During 2008 and in the years following California’s initiative, many states,
including Ohio, decided to act preemptively to prevent a costly initiative battle. Colorado
was the first state to create a board to facilitate discussions between humane farming
advocates, like the Humane Society, and agricultural producers and the groups that
represent their interests, and to develop humane livestock standards. Colorado,
threatened by a costly initiative (Ballotpedia) designed to prohibit the confinement of
farm animals, decided to negotiate with farm animal welfare policy proponents. After a
meeting between the Humane Society of the United States and multiple state agricultural
groups – a meeting mediated by the governor, the agriculture commissioner, and famed
bioethicist and Colorado State University philosophy professor Dr. Bernard Rollin -- the
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Senate Agriculture Committee and House Agriculture Committee chairmen introduced
legislation, which passed by a wide margin in both houses of the legislature in 2008. The
legislation phases out veal crates and sow gestation crates over different lengths of time
(Humane Society of the United States May 14, 2008). It also created an “advisory board”
under the state Commissioner of Agriculture “to review animal husbandry practices”
(Colorado Farm Bureau News May 20, 2008). In return, the Humane Society withdrew
its initiative. The Farm Bureau hopes the board will ensure “animal welfare and
husbandry questions are submitted to a process based on science and not emotion”
(Colorado Farm Bureau News May 20, 2008).
Compromise was again key to avoiding a costly initiative battle while responding
to consumer concerns in 2009 in Michigan. Perhaps taking her cue from Colorado and
hoping to avoid the contention she was seeing in neighboring Ohio after legislators in her
own state introduced legislation to preempt a threatened ballot initiative, the governor
and speaker pro-tempore gathered legislators, agricultural industry representatives and
the Humane Society to work on compromise legislation (Johnson October 9, 2009;
Michigan Agri-Business Association). House Bill 5127 restricted the confinement of
animals in much the same way the Humane Society has advocated in multiple states and
primarily is concerned with veal calves, egg-laying hens, and gestating sows (Michigan
Compiled Law Section 287.246). House Bill 5128, which would create a nine-member
Animal Care Advisory Council under the state’s Department of Agriculture, was
introduced shortly after the passage of House Bill 5127. That bill is currently in
committee (Michigan Legislature).
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In both Colorado and Michigan, two keys to successful discussions and
concessions from both sides of the issue seem present. The first is the involvement of a
neutral party, one who stands to gain in no way from standards that benefit producers or
animal welfare activists, in a “facilitator” or “mediator” role. In Colorado, Dr. Rollin,
who balances ethical and philosophical arguments about animal agriculture at Colorado’s
land grant university, primarily filled that role. In part, the governor also played the role
of facilitator, although a student of political science might argue that he would gain
politically by avoiding a costly, and divisive, initiative battle in his state. In Michigan,
the governor appears to have played the role of mediator, bringing both animal welfare
activists and agricultural producers to the table to avoid the division brewing in Ohio in
2009. The second key to success seems to be interest groups, both special and public,
relying on the statutory authority resident in the legislature to adopt standards agreed
upon by each side of the debate. By allowing the legislature to create laws regarding
standards, special and public interest groups avoiding costly ballot initiatives,
demonstrated trust in the people’s elected representatives to adopt reasonable standards,
and created bodies, adaptable through legislative processes instead of additional
constitutional amendments, through which future dialogue on livestock issues could
continue.

BOARD CREATION ABOUNDS
The successful use of negotiations to avoid ballot initiatives and the potential of
an advisory board to help guide farm animal welfare policy decisions seemed attractive to
other states. With and without the threat of an initiative, Oklahoma, West Virginia,
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Missouri, Kentucky, Illinois, Idaho, and Vermont have taken legislative action to create
livestock care standards boards∗ (Oklahoma House of Representatives February 18,
2010; West Virginia Legislature February 26, 2010; Animal Law Coalition May 15,
2010; Animal Law Coalition February 17, 2010; American Veterinary Medical
Association July 2010). Instead of creating a new advisory board, Indiana and Louisiana
legislated new responsibilities for their existing Boards of Animal Health (Indiana
General Assembly 2010; American Veterinary Medical Association July 2010).
Alabama reinforced the state Department of Agriculture’s authority to make animal
husbandry decisions (American Veterinary Medical Association July 2010); and
Utah expanded the duties of the existing Agricultural Advisory Board to include
recommendations on animal husbandry practices (American Veterinary Medical
Association July 2010). In 2009 and 2010, only two states – Massachusetts and Maine –
passed legislation directly outlawing certain types of confinement of farms animals
(Animal Law Coalition April 12, 2009; Animal Law Coalition May 15, 2009). Rhode
Island tabled legislation banning certain types of confinement (Animal Law Coalition
April 5, 2010), while Georgia and South Carolina passed “intent to occupy” legislation at
the state level preventing lower jurisdictions from creating farm animal husbandry
policies (State of Georgia Senate Research Office 2009; Animal Law Coalition April 12,
2009).
In almost all cases where a board was created to discuss or develop standards, it
was done so through a legislature’s statutory authority instead of by constitutional

While multiple states took legislative action, that action may or may not have been completed during the
legislative session. Some of the proposed bills remain in committee, or are out of committee but have not
been approved by the legislature as a whole.
∗
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amendment, as was the case in Ohio. Most of the boards have representation, like
Ohio’s, from producers, commodity groups, veterinarians, animal scientists, and
consumers, although not all of the boards include humane society representatives. The
Colorado Farm Bureau makes no mention of a humane society representative on the
advisory board created by Senate Bill 201 (Colorado Farm Bureau News May 20, 2008),
and Kentucky’s board reserves no seat for a humane society representative (Kentucky
Revised Statutes Chapter 257.192). However, West Virginia’s Livestock Care Standards
Board, modeled closely after Ohio’s, does (West Virginia Code Chapter 19 Section 191C-1). In many cases, producers and legislators view the boards as long-term,
comprehensive approaches to the issue of humane livestock standards and the best
method for balancing agricultural interests with public concerns, often advocated by
powerful special interest groups, about food sources and consumer confidence in food
safety. In the states that have chosen not to include humane farming advocates in their
board membership, the balance is clearly tipped in favor of producers and agricultural
interests, but that is not to say that public concerns and consumer confidence are being
ignored. Their concerns may just be being considered through the eyes of a producer. As
the executive vice president of the Ohio Pork Producers Council indicated, the way
producers think about customers is changing as a result of the initiatives and board
discussions in several states. No longer are processors considered their primary
customer; the base has broadened and producers are beginning to consider what the
public thinks of various farming practices (Isler December 2010). Still, many of the
achievements of these boards remain to be seen. In the end, they may result in valuable
advancements in the treatment of livestock on farms across the United States, or they
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may simply shore up the dominance traditional commodity producer groups have over
determining “best management practices” for various kinds of livestock. But one thing is
for certain, including humane farming advocates on the boards creates a much greater
impression of willingness to hold meaningful dialogue and possible compromise than
appearing to ignore the interests who brought the issue of humane livestock treatment to
light to begin with. In this way, the boards have important symbolic value, but the future
may prove they also actually work.
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III. OHIO’S APPROACH TO HUMANE FARM ANIMAL POLICY
After experiencing success in 2008 in California, the Humane Society of the
United States targeted Ohio – which ranks in the top 10 states in both egg and hog
production – for an initiative campaign for humane farm animal treatment standards
(Hinman 2010). On February 17, 2009, Humane Society representatives met with the
Ohio Farm Bureau Federation, Ohio Cattleman’s Association, Ohio Pork Producers
Council, and representatives from the other state-level animal agriculture and veterinary
medical associations to discuss opportunities to negotiate humane farm animal legislation
in the state (Zippay March 5, 2009). After the meeting, instead of working toward a
possible compromise with Humane Society officials, state agriculture business leaders,
including the Ohio Farm Bureau Federation, worked with Ohio politicians, including the
governor’s office and multiple legislators, to draft a joint resolution to preempt a possible
Humane Society initiative campaign (Langel et al. November 15, 2009; Johnson
September 6, 2009; Stimpert October 2010; Lynch November 2010).
In mid-June 2009, Senators Bob Gibbs and Jason Wilson and Representatives
Allan Sayre and Margaret Ruhl introduced identical legislation, House Joint Resolution 2
and Senate Joint Resolution 6, in each of their respective chambers of the Ohio General
Assembly (Lynch November 2010). Each version of the resolution moved quickly
through the legislative process, with amended Senate Joint Resolution 6 being approved
by both chambers of the General Assembly on July 13 (Ohio General Assembly 2009).
The Democratically-controlled House approved the resolution 83 to 16, and the
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Republican Senate accepted the House’s amendments later that day with a 31 to 1 vote
(Gongwer News Service Ohio July 13, 2009). The legislative referendum Issue 2, which
asked voters to amend the Ohio Constitution by creating a Livestock Care Standards
Board, was cleared to be included on the November ballot. According to then-Ohio
Governor Ted Strickland’s advisor for agricultural policy, the legislature, the special
interest groups, and the governor supported a constitutional amendment because of the
importance of needing “buy-in” from the voters. All parties in support of Issue 2 were
certain the Humane Society would come to Ohio with an official ballot initiative “sooner
or later” and when that happened, voters needed to question why they were being asked
to vote on livestock care standards again (Lynch November 2010).
During the campaign for and against Issue 2, more than $4 million in
contributions were reported in support of Issue 2, with roughly 75 percent of that amount
coming from Ohio farmers and farming and commodity organizations and 25 percent
coming from out-of-state commodity and producer organizations. Meanwhile, “no
contributions or expenditures [were] reported by Issue 2 opponents, including the
Humane Society of the United States” (Nash October 23, 2010). In November, 64
percent of Ohio voters approved Issue 2 (White November 4, 2009), passing in 87 of
Ohio’s 88 counties (Ohio Secretary of State, State Issue 2 Official Results November 3,
2009).

THE OHIO LIVESTOCK CARE STANDARDS BOARD
By law, the Ohio Livestock Care Standards Board is charged with “establishing
standards governing the care and well-being of livestock and poultry” while considering
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factors that include, but are not limited to, agricultural best management
practices for such care and well-being, biosecurity, disease prevention,
animal morbidity and mortality data, food safety practices, and the
protection of local, affordable food supplies for consumers. (Ohio
Constitution, article XIV, Section 1(A))
The 13-member board is chaired by the director of the state Department of Agriculture,
has 10 members who are appointed by the governor (Table 2); one member (a family
farmer*) appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives; and one member
(also a family farmer) appointed by the President of the Senate (Ohio Constitution, article
XIV, Section 1(A)). When the board began meeting in late spring of 2010, the overall
membership included three veterinarians,∍ the owner-operator of a certified organic farm,
representation from multiple county- and state-level farming organizations, and a
consumer representative with experience advising lawmakers about food insecurity
policy in the state (Appendix C). Unlike some other states, the traditional agricultural
establishment does not dominate board membership, nor is the board filled with people
who had previously been regularly involved in Ohio political discussions. The
governor’s office appears to have worked to create a board that truly incorporates the
opinions and concerns of multiple special and public interests throughout the state.

*

The definition of “family farmer” is not delineated in the resolution, the subsequent constitutional
amendment, or implementing legislation. The lack of definition is a major discussion point for some who
think the board will be stacked in favor of “big agriculture” interests; however, as a member of the Ohio
Livestock Care Standards Board representing “family farmers,” Stacey Atherton emphasizes that “farms
are changing” and very few farming families “do it all” now, which enables them to “have a life.” She is
one of four owners of her farm, sharing ownership with male family members, but they also employ 15 to
18 non-family members. Further, what many consider “corporate farms” are often family-oriented.
(Atherton October 2010)
∍
The Ohio Veterinary Medical Association (OVMA) had previously testified before the Ohio House
Agriculture and Natural Resources Committee and Ohio Senate Agriculture Committee that OVMA
“would like to see more than two veterinarians represented on the 13-member board” as prescribed by the
implementing legislation. (DVM Newsmagazine, June 28, 2009)
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Table 2. Ohio Livestock Care Standards Board Membership Summary
Number of
Description
members
4
Agricultural establishment (producers, agribusiness, government agencies)
2
Alternative agriculture (small farm and organic farming advocates)
1
Animal welfare activist
4
Neutral scientists and academics
2
Consumer advocates
Source: http://www.ohiolivestockcarestandardsboard.org/content/board/about_board.aspx

GIVING THE BOARD TIME TO WORK
For the first half of 2010, it did not appear as though the creation of a Livestock
Care Standards Board would prevent the Humane Society of the United States from
returning to Ohio with an initiative to legislate, by direct democracy, standards the board
would then have to implement. Ostensibly an initiative by Ohioans for Humane Farms,
the proposal was backed by the Humane Society, as well as Farm Sanctuary, United Farm
Workers, the Ohio Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, the Center for Food
Safety, the Consumer Federation of America, and the Center for Science in the Public
Interest – organizations that had, generally, previously opposed Ohio’s 2009 Issue 2
(Agriculture in Ohio October 15, 2009). But on June 30, 2010 – the day signatures
collected in support of a ballot initiative are due to the Ohio Secretary of State – the
Humane Society chose not to file. The choice followed two days of intense discussions,
requested and facilitated by the governor’s staff, at the governor’s mansion between the
Humane Society, Ohio Poultry Association, Ohio Pork Producers Council, Ohio
Cattleman’s Association, Ohio Corn Growers Association, Ohio Soybean Association,
and the Ohio Farm Bureau Federation (Lynch November 2010; Minton November 2010).
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The two-day discussion resulted in the creation of a “contract” signed by all
parties to the discussion called The Agreement (Appendix E).# In The Agreement, the
signing organizations agreed to recommend the enactment of reforms related to
“cockfighting, puppy mills, keeping dangerous exotic animals as pets, and the five
elements of the ballot measure relating to livestock agriculture” (Pacelle July 1, 2010).
Specifically, the groups agreed to recommend to the Ohio Livestock Care Standards
Board a phase-out of veal and sow gestation crates, a ban on strangling animals on farms
or transporting downer cattle,∗ and a moratorium on the building of new battery cage
facilities for laying hens in Ohio (Pacelle July 1, 2010; Minton November 2010). In
exchange for these concessions from agricultural production groups, the Humane Society
agreed not to submit its 2010 initiative to the Ohio Secretary of State or to litigate to
force the board to adopt the livestock standards they intended to propose in their unfiled
2010 ballot initiative (Minton November 2010). As a result of the last-ditch discussions,
the Humane Society received support for the improvement of livestock care standards in
Ohio from the agricultural groups, while agricultural groups were granted time for the
Ohio Livestock Care Standards Board to clearly define what new standards should be and
the timeline for those standards take effect. (Historically, agricultural groups seem to
have perceived the timelines in Humane Society initiatives as too aggressive.)
What is not clear in any of the newspaper articles or other publicly available
information is why all the parties agreed to come back to the table to negotiate. The

#

The “contract” is not a legal contract and, hence, is non-binding; however, the threat of the initiative
which underlies The Agreement remains an important consideration behind the board’s work.
∗
Federal regulations regarding downer animals apply only to animals at processing plants. The board’s
effort to address how downer animals should be treated on the farm is meant to address this apparent
loophole in the federal law (Atherton October 11, 2010).
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agricultural establishment groups had appeared to have the upper hand throughout most
of 2009 and 2010. They had prevented a Humane Society-funded ballot initiative in
2009, successfully lobbied for the creation of a livestock care standards board, and had
been satisfied with the number and type of representation they had through the board and
its subcommittees during the board’s initial efforts to create livestock standards. On the
other hand, the Humane Society had easily gathered more than enough signatures to
support its 2010 ballot initiative in Ohio that, if passed, would dictate certain standards
and require the board to adopt them. Suddenly, both sides of the debate agreed to sit
down to negotiate. To the governor’s policy advisor, it was not such a surprise.
According to her, the Humane Society prefers to negotiate instead of wage expensive
ballot initiative campaigns (Lynch November 2010). Additionally, informal polling by
both the Humane Society and the Ohio Farm Bureau Federation indicated the animal
welfare group had the needed support to win a ballot initiative, which would force
producers to change production standards and accept an aggressive timeline to implement
changes (Lynch November 2010). Undoubtedly, the governor’s advisor was also
motivated to call the meeting because of the office’s previous role in working with the
Farm Bureau to draft the legislation that led to Issue 2 and publicly supporting the Ohio
Livestock Care Standards Board’s creation and mission. The governor’s policy advisor
clearly had an interest in seeing the board succeed.
But what had gotten all the parties to the point where such last-minute discussions
even provided hope of a compromise? Some time before June 2010, an attorney
representing a large egg farm in Ohio contacted the Humane Society’s Wayne Pacelle
and asked what a compromise would look like if producers and the Humane Society
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could reach one (Lynch November 2010). After a reply from the Humane Society and
some discussion with the egg producer, the attorney called the governor’s office and
requested a meeting. The meeting between Wayne Pacelle, the egg farm attorney, the
governor’s Executive Assistant for Agricultural Policy, and the governor’s Chief of Staff,
during which they examined what a potential compromise might look like, resulted in the
governor’s agricultural policy assistant taking draft compromise language to the Ohio
Farm Bureau Federation (Lynch November 2010). The draft verbiage bounced between
the Humane Society, the Farm Bureau and the individual commodity groups until June
28. After weeks of working to reach a compromise, with the deadline to file a ballot
initiative two days away, and knowing the Humane Society had enough signatures to get
a measure on the ballot, the governor’s agricultural policy advisor called Wayne Pacelle
and convinced him to come to Ohio to sit down with the commodity groups to try to
reach a final compromise (Lynch November 2010). The compromise, The Agreement,
gives the board time to do what it was intended to do, time to see if the board can provide
a voice to a variety of interests, both public and private, in the state’s efforts to develop
more humane livestock standards.

ENTREPRENEURS AND FIXERS
Perhaps the most important reason the board appears to be a viable policy-making
body is that it has the time to engage in discussions about the various livestock standards
it was chartered to address in its implementing legislation. Bardach makes a wise
observation about the development and implementation of public policy:
Policy formation and implementation proceeds by trial and error, after all,
not only because it is inevitable, up to a point, but also because it is
47

desirable. Like most successful social learning, good policy development
is learning by doing. (Bardach 1979, 275)
If this is the case, giving an approach to policy time to work is essential. Regarding the
Ohio Livestock Care Standards Board, no one on the board or closely linked to the
board’s decisions thinks the approach Ohio has chosen to take in regards to examining
and developing humane livestock standards is simple (Atherton October 2010; Minton
November 2010). The implementing legislation creating the Ohio Livestock Care
Standards Board requires it to examine not only the well-being of veal calves, pregnant
sows and laying hens as a Humane Society initiative would have done, but directs the
board to consider a wide variety of livestock, including pork, cattle, goats, sheep, poultry,
alpacas and llamas (Ohio Legislative Service Commission, Final Analysis, Sub. H.B.
414). The board members and subcommittee members are not experts on rearing
standards for each of these different types of livestock. Time is necessary for them to
examine current practices in Ohio, best practices suggested by commodity and livestock
organizations, and scientific research related to the impact on the animals of current best
management practices and alternative practices. Without The Agreement that ended the
Humane Society’s 2010 initiative campaign, the board would not have had time to
consider, in adequate detail, each of these subjects for each of these species, and may
have been forced by the political climate and situation in Ohio to adopt short-sighted or
even standards more harmful to animals than current practices.
What allowed The Agreement to come to pass, and ultimately created a climate in
which the board has time to consider its responsibilities and make well-considered
recommendations, are two key people. The first was a policy entrepreneur. As Roberts
and King describe policy entrepreneurs, they are “outside the formal positions of
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government,” but work to “introduce, translate and help implement new ideas into public
practice” (Roberts and King). Although the idea of compromising with the Humane
Society on how to develop humane livestock standards had been pursued in other states,
Ohio’s agricultural establishment had almost summarily dismissed it after February 2009.
It took a policy entrepreneur, willing to introduce a new idea into Ohio’s public
administrative and political landscape, to actually move dialogue about standards forward
in a more inclusive manner. In Ohio, that entrepreneur was the lawyer who represented a
major egg producer and who reached out to the Humane Society about what a
compromise might look like and then the governor’s office once a compromise seemed
reasonable.
Equally important to creating the kind of environment where the board would
actually have time to work, was the governor’s Executive Assistant for Agricultural
Policy. In Ohio, that policy advisor, Jennifer Lynch, acted as a sort of policy fixer. At
her invitation, Wayne Pacelle of the Humane Society returned to Ohio for discussions in
the days leading up to the deadline to file a ballot initiative, and state agricultural leaders
at odds with animal welfare interests were able to sit down and discuss with him what a
final compromise might look like and how each of the parties to the compromise might
be held accountable. By making these discussions happen, she essentially changed the
system in which livestock care standards decisions would be made in Ohio. Bardach may
as well have been describing how to develop and implement humane livestock standards
at the state level when he said
A single governmental strategy may involve the complex and interrelated
activities of several levels of governmental bureaus and agencies, private
organizations, professional associations, interest groups, and clientele
populations. How can this profusion of activities be controlled and
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directed? This questions is at the heart of what has come to be known…as
the ‘implementation problem.’ (Bardach 1979, 5)
In Ohio, as in other states, developing recommendations for livestock care requires the
state to balance the concerns and interests of multiple state agencies, county humane
societies, commodity groups, state-wide agricultural groups, and consumers. Yet, the
board’s work was being constrained by the pressure of a potential ballot initiative that
would have forced them to adopt certain standards. When the opportunity presented
itself, Lynch seized upon the chance to shield the board and its decision making from the
“constantly shifting set of political and social pressures” it faced while trying to develop
standards of care and methods of implementation (Bardach 1979, 5). She accomplished
this by facilitating discussions that led to The Agreement, which essentially adjusts the
environment, or changes the system, in which the board has made and will make standard
recommendations.
Intervening at the final hour to avoid a 2010 initiative was not the first time she
had been involved in defining the environment in which humane livestock standards
would be defined in the state though. In 2009, she had worked with the Ohio Farm
Bureau Federation to draft the initial legislation, then submitted by the resolution’s
sponsors in the General Assembly, that created Issue 2 (Lynch November 2010). She had
also been an advocate of reaching a compromise between the Humane Society and Ohio
agricultural groups in early 2010 – often passing draft compromises between parties –
when the two sides of the debate first began considering one after the policy
entrepreneur, the egg farmer, reached out the animal welfare group. Perhaps most
influentially, though, she pushed for The Agreement by calling Wayne Pacelle and
agricultural leaders and asking them to all sit down in a room together to finalize and
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formalize a compromise. Her actions played a defining role in preventing a 2010
Humane Society initiative and bought the Ohio Livestock Care Standards Board time to
develop and vet standards with producers, consumers and the public alike as the original
idea of the board had intended.
As Bardach describes it, such actions are essentially “fixing,” a key aspect of
which is “adjusting certain elements of the system of games – which in the aggregate can
be thought of as a single massive implementation game played against the policy
mandate itself – so as to lead to a more preferred outcome” (Bardach 1979, 274). In
Ohio, that preferred outcome was the opportunity to avoid an expensive and potentially
divisive initiative campaign in 2010 – a benefit to both agriculture groups and humane
farming advocates alike – and the opportunity to see if the Ohio Livestock Care
Standards Board, whose creation was supported by the governor and agricultural groups,
would work, as “advisory committees” had in other states, to create reasonable, wellconsidered standards deemed acceptable by consumers, producers and animal welfare
activists alike.
As Bardach points out, not everyone who watches the political games that are
played to facilitate the development of policy or implementation of legislation is
comfortable with the idea of a “fixer.” He highlights that although “game-fixing is
quintessentially government by men rather than laws,” it is not “necessarily…
irresponsible government” (Bardach 1979, 278). He suggests that there are “legal and
customary bounds” that limit the actions of fixers (Bardach 1979, 278). An important
part of the “check” on the governor’s advisor’s power to act as a fixer in this case is the
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opportunity for future ballot initiatives and the potential of being fired by the governor
for taking actions his administration does not support.

EXPERT INFLUENCE
The Ohio Livestock Care Standards Board has also benefited from the
involvement of a group of animal science experts. When defining the process through
which the board would adopt livestock care standards, the board divided the work among
various subcommittees. Each subcommittee except the Technical Research Advisory
Committee (TRAC) is tackling the standards that pertain to a specific species. The
Technical Research Advisory Committee has six members and is chaired by the state
veterinarian (Table 3). Because the members of the committee extensive knowledge in
the field of animal science and have experience in evaluating the methodology of
scientific research and design research approaches, the committee is a valuable technical
party. Admittedly, the TRAC’s members are not entirely neutral: they have ties to both
government agencies and institutions and industry through research contracts and
research funding. But in the case of their involvement in the board’s standards
development, they remain Ohio’s most qualified animal science experts who have
applicable knowledge required to advise the other subcommittees and the board about the
science, research, and other considerations behind species-specific standard
recommendations.
Despite ties to industry, the TRAC has tried to maintain scientific neutrality. Its
attempts at neutrality are demonstrated by its dissent with the veal subcommittee.
Although the veal subcommittee was one of the first species-specific subcommittees
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formed because the treatment of veal was anticipated to be on the Humane Society’s
ballot initiative, as of March 2011, standards had yet to be adopted by the board. As of
November, the veal subcommittee was reticent to recommend changes to current veal
management practices in Ohio, which permit the confinement of veal calves for the
majority of any 24-hour period. Humane Society of the United States Ohio State
Director Karen Minton revealed that, at that time, the veal subcommittee had yet to hold
a vote recommending improved standards be adopted by the board (November 2010).
The improved standards, if recommended to the board, would bring Ohio veal producers’
minimum treatment standards into line with the national-level American Veal
Association’s production standards, adopted in 2007, which recommend that veal
producers use group housing instead of individual confinement crates for veal calf
production (Minton November 2010), a practice that would require Ohio’s veal producers
to modify existing facilities and learn new ways to manage their production. Despite the
lack of forward progress in defining improved standards for veal production in Ohio or
justifying current production practices, the TRAC committee chairman appeared to speak
out in opposition of the state’s veal producers when he publicly commented at a Ohio
Livestock Care Standards Board meeting that TRAC did not support the tethering of veal
calves (Ohio Livestock Care Standards Board Meeting Minutes November 2, 2010). #
Ohio’s technical experts have been engaged throughout the board’s efforts. As,
essentially, technocrats, the TRAC members have guided discussions toward a more
#

Although not entirely neutral, the members of the TRAC are also kept from being entirely beholden to
agricultural interests who might control research funding by a sense of research integrity. The importance
of applying scientific rigor despite funding sources is all the more important to scientific researchers around
the world considering the recent revival of media coverage of the integrity failings of one scientists who
falsified findings in order to, as is suspected, gain financially. His research, widely discredited, linked
childhood vaccinations to the development of autism in children. Dedication to sound science, despite
funding sources, remains a powerful motivator.
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comprehensive approach instead of limiting policy options, as some experts might favor.
In other states, like Colorado, the experts played an important role in mediating
discussions between the Humane Society and agricultural producers prior to a board or
advisory committee being established. In Ohio, the experts remain an important part of
advising species-specific subcommittees how to organize their research efforts, where to
begin their research, and how to make decisions based on the facts available to them.
The TRAC also “screens” subcommittee recommendations to the board and can make
recommendations independent of the subcommittees if the opinion of the Technical
Research Advisory Committee members differs significantly from the anticipated
recommendations from a species subcommittee (Appendix F). Ultimately, however, any
choice between a TRAC recommendation and a species subcommittee recommendation
is the board’s alone.
Table 3. Ohio Livestock Care Standards Board
Technical Research Advisory Committee
Dr. Tony Forshey
State Veterinarian and committee chair
Dr. Naomi Brotheras
The Ohio State University Department of Animal Sciences
Dr. Candace Croney
The Ohio State University College of Veterinary Medicine
Dr. James Kinder
The Ohio State University Department of Animal Sciences
Dr. Steve Moeller
The Ohio State University Department of Animal Sciences
Dr. Henry Zerby
The Ohio State University Department of Animal Sciences
Source: Ohio Livestock Care Standards Board Meeting Minutes, June 1, 2010.
http://www.ohiolivestockcarestandardsboard.gov/content/news/mminutes.aspx

The Technical Research Advisory Committee, in a way, can ensure standards are
indeed created based on science, as intended by the legislature and approved by the
voters, instead of simply based on the persuasiveness of an interest group – either special
or public. The board’s species subcommittees often have a higher number of producers
compared to concerned citizens, animal ethicists, or food security experts (Minton
November 2010), but through the TRAC’s guidance, the subcommittees cannot be
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entirely captured by industry interests who may be more focused on protecting farmers
from production cost increases than the science behind rearing methods. Instead, the
TRAC appears to be using its technical expertise to keep the subcommittees focused on
actually addressing the issue of developing humane livestock standards or educating
consumers about why the current practices are actually best for a particular species of
livestock.

COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH
The Technical Research Advisory Committee also seems to have played an
important role in defining how the board chose to approach the development of humane
livestock standards. During the June 1, 2010, Ohio Livestock Care Standards Board
meeting – the first held after the public listening sessions in May – the Technical
Research Advisory Committee suggested two possible approaches to developing
livestock care standards in Ohio. First, they suggested that the board address the issues
raised in the proposed Humane Society-support ballot initiative; however, the committee
noted that, despite the fact that such an approach would allow the board to “get ahead of
certain ballot issues” and would be “relatively easy,” the approach would fail to address
other potentially “problematic issues” (Ohio Livestock Care Standards Board Meeting
Minutes Technical Research Advisory Committee Update June 1, 2010). This approach
essentially meant the board would address the development of minimum housing
standards for breeding sows, laying hens and veal calves, with an eye toward eliminating
or minimizing the possibility of a Humane Society initiative that hoped to outlaw the use
of gestation crates and other confinement systems generally accepted as standard
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production practices in the pork, egg and veal industries. This approach would be
simpler than other approaches since it would limit the amount of decisions the board
would be required to consider and the amount of information they would be required to
review would be much less than if considering more than just housing practices;
however, as TRAC pointed out, one could reasonably anticipate that other animal welfare
concerns would need to be considered in the future and that tackling the issue of housing
alone would fail to consider the impact of other production practices and common
standards.
The second approach TRAC suggested, and officially favored, was the speciesspecific approach. A species-specific approach would allow the board to address all
areas of species care – housing (the major concern of most ballot initiative), feed and
water, management, environment, health, transportation and slaughter – but would likely
be more time-consuming (Ohio Livestock Care Standards Board Meeting Minutes
Technical Research Advisory Committee Update June 1, 2010). This approach was
definitely more comprehensive than the first approach, but would also require more time,
energy and effort and board member dedication because of the amount of information
that would need to be reviewed before standards could be recommended and because of
the number of issues that would be considered. Instead of considering how animals are
housed, this approach would attempt to address nearly all aspects of animal care.
In the end, the approach Ohio ended up with became a mixture of the two
approaches suggested by the Technical Research Advisory Committee. The Ohio
Livestock Care Standards Board chose to adopt the second, more comprehensive
approach to addressing the issue of farm animal welfare standards in Ohio. However, the
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board’s chairman, Ohio Department of Agriculture Director Robert Boggs, emphasized
that the board’s priorities should be the proposed ballot initiative’s concerns (Minton
November 2010). This emphasis became even more important after The Agreement was
signed the summer of 2010. Thus, the Ohio Livestock Care Standards Board has
approached the development of humane livestock standards from a species-specific point
of view, which has and will allow them to develop more comprehensive standards of care
than a ballot initiative focused solely on the housing practices for three species. But the
board, under guidance from the board’s chairman and in the spirit of The Agreement, the
board has also chosen to address euthanasia standards, the handling of disabled livestock,
and the handling of veal calves, swine and laying hens first before moving on to other
species. This focus lines up directly with industry and Humane Society concerns about
loopholes in existing regulations related to non-ambulatory animals and on-farm
euthanasia standards; and the Humane Society’s proposed ballot initiative’s concerns
with the extreme confinement of veal calves, laying hens and sows (Minton November
2010).
All people interviewed as part of the author’s research recognized the value in the
more comprehensive approach to developing standards of care on farms across Ohio.
Even though some had initially opposed the creation of the board or the process that had
led to Senate Joint Resolution 6, those asked now viewed it as an important group where
consumers and experts in animal behavior, ethics, farming, and food security could
address current and anticipated livestock care issues. As the executive director of the
Ohio Veterinary Medical Association pointed out, the board members seem sincere in
their efforts to address consumer concerns and have created conversation around the topic
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of humane livestock standards that veterinarians, producers, consumers and animal
activists would have never discussed before (Advent October 2010). The creation of the
Ohio Livestock Care Standards Board may have begun as a political maneuver by the
General Assembly, pressured by commodity groups in Ohio, to avoid an initiative
campaign by animal welfare groups, but the board does not appear to be under the control
of commodity groups. In fact, the board appears to have become the kind of body where
all interested parties can engage in dialogue about the facts and opinions behind livestock
welfare concerns and the potential implications of developing minimum standards
different from commonly accepted best management practices.

A CHOIR OF VOICES
By design, the Ohio Livestock Care Standards Board was created to include
representation from industry – both traditional and organic agriculture – and public
interest groups impacted by changes in minimum livestock treatment standards and from
both the Democratic and Republican parties. Unlike some other states, where the
creation of the board excluded membership from consumers or animal welfare groups,
Ohio’s purposefully includes them. When the Ohio Farm Bureau Federation first took
the idea of creating a livestock care standards board to the governor’s office and General
Assembly, it had included a suggested list of the kind of positions that should be included
on the board (Lynch November 2010). According to the governor’s agricultural policy
advisor, the list the Ohio Farm Bureau initially brought was very similar to the positions
now on the board. In her opinion, the Ohio Farm Bureau had “genuinely attempted to
maximize the expertise and value” on the proposed board so that it could be a body that
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would actually address issues of concern to Ohio agriculture and consumers (Lynch
November 2010), including protecting the industry in Ohio while addressing consumer
demand for more humanely raised animal products and affordable, safe food sources.
While the Ohio agriculture and commodity interests played an important role in defining
the type of people who would sit on the board, they actually played little, if any, role in
influencing who exactly would fill board vacancies. Board members were selected by the
governor’s office after nominating themselves through Ohio’s boards and commissions
process (Lynch November 2010; Office of the Governor’s Boards and Commissions).
Because the governor determines the ultimate membership of the Ohio Livestock Care
Standards Board and because anyone with interest in being a board member can apply for
an opening position, the process of defining the membership of the board provides more
opportunities for access to the political and rulemaking process than a legislative decision
would have. By extension, one could argue that since the process is more inclusive the
board membership is more representative of the general public than the General
Assembly.
Although the initiative process never reached its fullest expression in 2009 or
2010 in Ohio’s debate over farm animal welfare standards, the involvement of certain
parties in the campaign for the Issue 2 referendum is illustrative of what type of
organizations and agencies would have been engaged in an initiative campaign to create
minimum standards. As in other states who faced initiative campaigns, or the threat of
them, on the subject of humane farming standards, the primary proponent of adopting
restrictions on farm animal confinement and other standard production practices was the
Humane Society of the United States. In Ohio, the political action committee Ohioans
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for Humane Farms, backed by the Humane Society, officially opposed the 2009
referendum and sponsored the 2010 initiative signature gathering in Ohio (Ohioans for
Humane Farms).♦ On the opposite side of the debate, representing agricultural interests
while opposing any initiatives creating minimum standards and supporting the Issue 2
referendum, was Ohioans for Livestock Care. The Ohioans for Livestock Care political
action committee worked with Melamed Communications, a leading Ohio political
consulting and strategic communications firm, and The Cochran Group, a public relations
firm, to lead the campaign in favor of Issue 2’s passage (Reuters December 8, 2009). No
influential voices expressing the general public’s opinion, consumer’s opinion,
veterinarian, food security, or safety were heard. Instead, the campaign for and against
Issue 2 belonged to basically two powerful, well-funded interest groups with the ability to
leverage political consultants and public relations firms: the Ohio Farm Bureau
Federation and the Humane Society of the United States. Any initiative campaign in
Ohio would have likely pitted the same two groups against each other.
Instead, the Ohio Livestock Care Standards Board appears to have mitigated the
influence each of these groups on the policy-making process by intentionally including
more voices in the discussion. In a way, the careful definition of the kind of members to
appoint to the board and the thoughtful selection of the actual people to fill those
positions does exactly what Fischer and Berry recommend. The Ohio Livestock Care

The mainpage of the Ohioans for Humane Farms website included a thank you letter from the Humane
Society of the United States’ Wayne Pacelle as of January 8, 2011. Additionally, the “About” sections lists
The Humane Society of the United States as an endorser of the political action committee’s ballot measure
(Ohioans for Humane Farms, www.ohiohumane.com). Tellingly, The Agreement, which prevented the
2010 ballot measure from being filed, was also signed by The Humane Society of the United States’ Wayne
Pacelle, not an Ohioans for Humane Farms representative, and The Humane Society is the group who
elected not to file the ballot initiative in Ohio after reaching The Agreement (Minton November 3, 2010;
Lynch November 30, 2010)
♦
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Standards Board appears to facilitate the inclusion of a broader range of opinions in the
policy-making process by increasing opportunities for participation from public interest
groups and balancing the influence of special interest groups by carefully defining the
problems to be addressed and the values or beliefs that underpin the problems.
Despite this intentional inclusion of multiple interests in the discussions that will
address the demand for more humane livestock standards in Ohio, room for improvement
in public responsiveness remains. While the author maintains that the board has provided
more access to the discussion than the legislative process or the initiative process would
have, there is limited evidence that the public comments solicited at each board meeting,
subcommittee meeting and listening session have an impact on the board’s discussions,
unless the person commenting represents a group already engaged in the rule making
process. Certainly, the make-up of the board appears more representative of the various
opinions one is likely to find in the general public, taken as a whole, than the halls of the
General Assembly, open to well-funded lobbyist, or the initiative process whose
campaigns for and against farm animal welfare standards in Ohio pitted animal welfare
activists against agricultural establishment interests at the exclusion of less polarizing
opinions. However, beyond the verbal assurances of the board’s director that the
comments provided are considered by board members (Boggs October 2010), the one
occasion that can be cited where something a citizen said may have actually been
implemented,* and the fact rules proposed by the board must be submitted to the Joint
Committee on Agency Rule Review (JCARR) and therefore undergo periods of public

*

During one of the board’s May listening sessions, a person commented that the Department of Agriculture
should provide an electronic means through which citizens can submit comments without attending board
meetings. Citizens are able to do this through the board’s “Contact Us” page on the public.
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comment, the inclusion of comments and opinions of members of the general public
seems more symbolic than meaningful. Relying on officially defined, generally accepted
notice and written comment periods probably indicates that little “substantive
importance” is placed on the inputs (Kerwin and Furlong 2011, 175).

THE BOARD’S DECISIONS
In Ohio, a major fear voiced by those who opposed Issue 2 was that the process
that created the Ohio Livestock Care Standards Board was a power play by “big
agriculture” and that, once established, the board would be a body that would protect its
own agricultural interests through self-regulation. Some people accused the board of
being symbolic in nature, designed only to make the public feel good about addressing
humane livestock standards while ceding decision-making authority to a technocratic
elite and sacrificing democratic principles. While many of the board’s most difficult
decisions have yet to be made and the impact of a new gubernatorial administration and
future board member selections is yet to be determined, the board has made progress
regarding on-farm euthanasia standards, treatment of non-ambulatory animals on the
farm, care standards for multiple species, and civil penalties associated with violations
(Ohio Livestock Care Standards Board Meeting Minutes February 22, 2011). Euthanasia
and civil penalties sections of the standards took effect January 20, 2011, while the
sections related to “General Considerations for the Care and Welfare of Livestock” and
“Disabled and Distressed Livestock” have been filed with Joint Committee on Agency
Rule Review (Ohio Livestock Care Standards Board Meeting Minutes “Draft Livestock
Care Standards last modified 28 February 2011” February 22, 2011). As of February 28,
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the initial official public comment period on dairy cattle, beef cattle, sheep and goat draft
standards was open; and the board unanimously voted February 8 to send draft care
standards for swine and laying hens to the initial public comment process (Ohio
Livestock Care Standards Board Meeting Minutes February 8, 2011). The board’s
actions regarding the development of standards in the cases of swine and veal highlight
which interests are “winning,” and who in this public administration problem is getting
what. The swine and veal subcommittees’ recommendations and the board’s reaction to
them demonstrates the difficulty in finalizing standards, the opposition certain standards
face, and how negotiated standards seem to be the way ahead for many of the board’s
decisions. Constant pressure from the Humane Society and signatories to The Agreement,
as well as inputs from the Technical Research Advisory Committee, continue to guide the
board’s primary concerns and move discussions forward.
A look at how the swine care standards were developed reveals how animal
welfare and public interests worked with producers to write recommendations. Although
the recommended standards have not yet taken effect and some will not take effect until
the end of 2025, most parties involved seem satisfied with the compromise, including
pork producers and the Humane Society. Public interest groups had key points included
in the standards, while producers were able to secure important concessions throughout
the discussions held, primarily, at the subcommittee level in 2010. At the December 7,
2010, Ohio Livestock Care Standards Board meeting, the board reviewed the segments of
the standards being recommended by the Swine Subcommittee regarding the housing of
swine (Ohio Livestock Care Standards Board Meeting Minutes, December 7, 2010).
According to the meeting minutes, the board’s review of those recommended standards
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involved significant discussion, with the result being that the board members asked the
subcommittee to “meet again to refine the recommendations” (Ohio Livestock Care
Standards Board Meeting Minutes, December 7, 2010).
The recommendations being considered on December 7 “would allow swine
producers already in business, [sic] to essentially be ‘grandfathered’ in, so current
farmers could still ‘expand or modify current housing methods’ at existing facilities”;
however, The Agreement had specified the “phase-out of all gestation crates by the end
of 2025” and did not include a grandfather clause (Kick December 8, 2010). During the
public comment period of the December 7 meeting, Karen Minton, the State Director for
the Humane Society of the United States, voiced the organization’s opposition to the draft
swine housing standards because they conflicted with The Agreement. Additionally, Mr.
Jim Chakeres of the Ohio Poultry Association, one of the people who brokered and
signed The Agreement, reminded the board of the importance of The Agreement and that
the multiple state agriculture groups “stand behind” it (Ohio Livestock Care Standards
Board Meeting Minutes, December 7, 2010). Later in December, the Swine
Subcommittee met again and voted to remove the exemption from the recommendations
that would allow current swine operations to be grandfathered in to any new standards
(Kick, December 30, 2010). The revised recommendations, without the grandfather
clause, were resubmitted to the board in January 2011. At the full board’s first meeting in
2011, the board expressed unanimous initial approval of the swine standards, and on
February 2, the board voted to move the standards to the public comment phase of
development. They should be finalized in following months before being submitted for
JCARR approval (Kick, January 5, 2011).
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By removing the exemption, the committee seems to have bowed to public
interest group pressure, despite the State Veterinarian’s statement that stall housing is
best for sows (Kick, December 30, 2010). Through the Swine Subcommittee and Ohio
Livestock Care Standards Board process, agricultural interests were held accountable to
public interests and pressure from animal welfare groups in the development of overall
standards; however, agricultural interests were also able to obtain certain concessions
from opposition groups – namely the indefinite continued use of farrowing stalls to
protect piglets, the use of gestation stalls for limited times to allow “for confirmation of
pregnancy,” and the use of individual stalls for swine in “special circumstances” to
protect injured, frail, thin or aggressive swine (Kick, January 5, 2011). The process
seems to have worked to create standards the major public interest groups and
commodity groups can agree are fair and reasonable compromises.
By contrast, as of February 2011, the Ohio Livestock Care Standards Board had
yet to adopt the initial rules recommended by the Veal Subcommittee, despite having
reviewed them multiple times. The full board first reviewed the Veal Subcommittee’s
recommendations in mid-October 2010 and asked multiple follow-up questions about
“economic and morbidity and mortality issues of tethering veal calves” to the
subcommittee members (Ohio Livestock Care Standards Board Meeting Minutes October
19, 2010). The board again reviewed the draft veal standards on November 2. During
the meeting, the Humane Society commented that the draft standards were in conflict
with American Veterinary Medical Association guidelines and “prevailing industry
standards” (Ohio Livestock Care Standards Board Meeting Minutes November 2, 2010).
In addition to the Humane Society’s concerns with the draft standards, the Ohio
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Veterinary Medical Association offered support for the “alternative housing” standards
presented during the meeting by the Ohio Department of Agriculture staff – standards
that were in line with the American Veterinary Medical Association’s veal housing
policy. A major Ohio veal producer, who claimed to produce 36,000 of the 46,000 veal
calves marketed in Ohio each year, also expressed support for group housing, a practice
employed on its farm and at several others in the state (Ohio Livestock Care Standards
Board Meeting Minutes November 2, 2010). The board continued its discussion of draft
veal standards November 16, when a board member handed out copies of the American
Veal Association’s recommendation from May 9, 2007, to move to group housing. After
more discussion and public comments, the board passed a motion to accept the alternate
veal housing language proposed by the Ohio Department of Agriculture staff earlier in
the month by a vote of 7 to 4 (Ohio Livestock Care Standards Board Meeting Minutes
November 16, 2010). That housing language, slightly altered, is what appears in the draft
livestock care standards last updated February 28, 2011 (Ohio Livestock Care Standards
Board Meeting Minutes “Draft Livestock Care Standards last modified 28 February
2011” February 22, 2011). The board was scheduled to discuss the proposed veal
standards again February 22 (Ohio Livestock Care Standards Board Meeting Minutes
February 8, 2011). Although the board did not have time to discuss the standards a that
gathering, during the public comment period a veal producer who is also a member of the
Veal Subcommittee “presented the board with signed affidavits from veal farmers, which
state that the farmers will exit the veal industry if the currently proposed veal standards
are adopted by the board (Ohio Livestock Care Standards Board Meeting Minutes
February 22, 2011). The comment prompted one board member to stay he “does not
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want to be responsible for putting farms out of business” (Ohio Livestock Care Standards
Board Meeting Minutes February 22, 2011). In the case of developing veal standards,
agricultural interests and animal welfare groups appear to be unwilling to compromise
about mandated dates for converting to new housing practices or what those housing
practices should be (Kick, October 26, 2010).
The comment by a board member about not wanting to responsible for putting
farmers out of business may represent a weakness in the Ohio Livestock Care Standards
Board standard development process. While recommended standards for other species
will undoubtedly have a financial impact on producers of those species, the affidavits
from the veal producers represent the most certain negative impact to a producer, if the
veal producers make good on their threats if the board adopts the standards currently in
the draft rules document. The veal producers who signed affidavits may have just
entered a costly game of chicken. They seem to hope that by threatening to leave the veal
industry, they will be able to pressure the board into not adopting standards that prohibit
the tethering of veal calves. Amending the draft veal standards to prevent producers from
voluntarily exiting the market remains a real possibility. However, some veal producers
in Ohio support the adoption of alternative housing standards, as does the state and
national association of veterinarians and the national-level the American Veal
Association. So, the board may favor adopting national standards, despite threats from
individual producers to stop farming. The board may also be motivated to adopt
alternative housing standards since doing otherwise may nullify The Agreement with the
Humane Society. If The Agreement is nullified, the Humane Society and Ohioans for
Humane Farms likely continue to have enough public support, as was previously
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indicated by polling from both the Ohio Farm Bureau Federation and the Humane
Society (Lynch November 2010), to pass a ballot initiative forcing the board to adopt
group housing standards for veal calves. Thus, the threat of a ballot initiative remains an
important motivator behind the board’s future decisions regarding species-specific care
standards. The persuasive influence of the threat of an initiative is demonstrated in the
development of swine standards, when the board asked the subcommittee to reconsider
its recommendations so that they were in accordance with The Agreement, and now in
the development of veal standards, when the board has, at least initially, drafted veal
standards that are in accordance with The Agreement despite vocal opposition by a
number of veal producers.

GOOD FOR NOW, BUT FACING CHALLENGES
For now, Ohio can be reasonably satisfied that the Ohio Livestock Care Standards
Board is not a tool of the agricultural establishment, nor an animal welfare-controlled
rulemaking committee. Through the involvement of policy entrepreneurs, a fixer, and
people who unwittingly decided a problem-setting approach to the demand and
development of humane livestock standards would be better than a divisive initiative
campaign that emphasized emotion more than sound decision making, Ohio can be
assured that the board is body that has brought a multitude of interests and opinions to the
policy-making table, not because it is lucky, but because it is a well-designed
bureaucratic body that designed a sound process for exploring and developing livestock
standards. The path to engaging all parties meaningfully in the discussion took more than
a year and came down to an 11th hour decision, but consumer groups, animal welfare
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activists, producers, farmers and food security experts remain engaged in meaningful
dialogue about the science behind animal production, the possible impacts of changing
production standards, and ethics underpinning arguments in favor of each side of the
debate. As Jack Advent, Executive Director of the Ohio Veterinary Medical Association,
highlighted, “we didn’t agree with how the board got here, but we’re committed to
helping it work” (October 2010). Remaining committed to making it work seems to be
the attitude of all of the board members, subcommittee members and interested parties
who remain engaged in the efforts to develop standards that industry and public interest
groups can support. That commitment will be important as the board’s faces challenges
in the future.
One of the most difficult tasks the board faces will be remaining responsive to the
public and vigilant about incorporating public opinion and desires into the standards it
develops. Throughout the writing of this thesis, general public interest in the topic has
waned as the energy of the 2009 referendum has dissipated. Even the state’s major
newspapers have decreased their coverage of the board and its activities; the author has
routinely had to turn to agricultural-oriented publications for news coverage of the
board’s decisions and public reaction to them. As a result of waning public interest,
which could be predicted by Olson when he described large groups as generally latent
unless motivated to act for a specific gain, the importance of the Humane Society’s
continued engagement in the conversation and representation of public interests becomes
apparent. Without the Humane Society’s continued vigilance and involvement in
expressing public concerns with some agricultural practices during the Ohio livestock
care standards development process, the process stands a much higher chance of being
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captured by agricultural special interests. An agricultural establishment-captured process
would likely amount to a rulemaking process in which animal producers regulated their
own industry. What gives the animal welfare group leverage in the process is the
knowledge that they could mount an initiative campaign in the state to legislate certain
standards and that they likely have enough support for such an initiative to win. The
Humane Society remains engaged in the process not only because they are ideologically
in favor of better treatment of farm animals, but because they have the leverage and
power they need to be heard and heeded by the agriculture groups in Ohio.
The commitment of animal welfare groups, agricultural producer groups, board
members and subcommittee members to the standards development process is key.
Throughout 2009, the governor’s agricultural policy assistant often intervened to keep
communications between agriculture and animal welfare groups going. Once the Board
was established, the Director of the Ohio Department of Agriculture took the reins and
kept discussions between producers and animal welfare activists moving in a
collaborative direction to create standards all parties could get behind. But neither of
those individuals are involved in the process anymore, having been replaced by new
appointees after Governor John Kasich took office in early January 2010. Because
neither shepherd of the process holds the position of influence they once had, the
individuals involved in the standards development process thus far, including board
members and representatives from public and special interests groups, must judge that
they have invested too much in the process to abandon it now in favor of more
adversarial development setting like initiative and legislative campaign battles.
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That commitment is not guaranteed and the effect the new gubernatorial
administration will have on the board’s decisions remains uncertain. In addition to
controlling who fills the cabinet-level post of Director of the Ohio Department of
Agriculture, and thus is Chairman of the Ohio Livestock Care Standards Board, the new
governor will be naming board members as terms expire. As of March 2011, Governor
Kasich had not replaced the board members whose terms expired in January, so the only
change on the board remained the chairman. Undoubtedly, over time, changes to board
membership are unavoidable and there is no guarantee that new appointees will share the
same level of commitment to the process as current board members. Still, the threat of an
initiative remains a powerful motivator in Ohio and as new board members are named,
commodity groups are just as likely to hold the board accountable to the
recommendations made in the non-binding Agreement as animal welfare groups in an
effort to avoid an initiative. The Agreement enjoys the support of several statewide
agricultural groups who view working with animal welfare activists to develop standards
based on science more than emotion a better way to make animal husbandry decisions
than an emotionally charged initiative battle.
A final challenge the process faces in Ohio is enforcement. The Ohio Department
of Agriculture is charged with enforcing the standards currently in development for the
various species. The department’s interest in investigating reported violations depends in
part upon resources available and political inclination. To negate budget shortfalls, state
and local agencies currently expect dramatic budget constraints. In the case of the
Department of Agriculture, limited funding may influence the agency’s ability to
investigate reported violations. However, producers who are meeting standards have an
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interest in seeing other producers comply, to avoid unfair competition, so the industry
groups may become their own regulating agencies in such cases, perhaps invoking a kind
of “censure” on producers who do not comply with Ohio’s farm animal standards.
Additionally, since the governor appoints the director of agriculture, a governor who is
less favorable to government regulation of the private sector may create an environment
in the agency in which inclination to investigate and punish reported violations is low.
However, the potential negative political fallout of people finding out that the
Department of Agriculture knew of but did not investigate reported violations may be too
much to risk, especially considering that an individual motivated to report a violation of
the Ohio Revised Code about animal husbandry standards to the Ohio Department of
Agriculture for investigation is likely motivated to report it to an animal welfare
watchdog group capable of making it headlines in a number of media outlets.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION?
During the debate in which the legislature drafted the legislative referendum for
voter consideration in 2009, a few opponents voiced their concerns that the Ohio
Livestock Care Standards Board did not need to be in the Ohio Constitution (Ohio House
Session – Part 2 July 13, 2009). Implementing public policy is often about making
incremental changes that can be adjusted so the policy best achieves its stated aims, so
creating a rulemaking body within the constitution makes it difficult to change the
composition of that body in event that it, or the process it designs, is deficient in some
way. Ohio put itself in the situation of creating a bureaucratic agency with broad powers
that might be difficult to amend should it not work as planned; however, in Ohio’s
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particular case, the fact that the definition of board membership is in the constitution
serves to shield it from shifting political tides and changes in administration. Certainly,
the governor still yields considerable influence in making appointments to the board, but
a governor who favors fewer regulatory restrictions for the private sector cannot
substantially change the number, or kind, of voices on the board. For example, a
governor who feels influence from alternative agriculture or animal welfare groups who
favor certain restrictions might be detrimental to the animal husbandry industry cannot
eliminate those voices from the board’s membership. Nor can a governor stack the
board, by increasing its numbers, in favor of the agricultural establishment.
In a way, the fact that the board’s membership is set by the state constitution gives
public administrators time to learn about how the processes embraced and the rules
adopted by the board work during implementation. The rules are given a chance to take
effect without changes in the board’s makeup that might spur adjustments to adopted and
implemented standards. Further, much of the decision-making process is being done in
subcommittees. Because much of the decision-making process behind the board’s
recommended standards occurs outside of the board’s constitutional restrictions, what
public administrators learn can be applied to improve upon the process as standards take
effect. As a result, the process in Ohio remains somewhat protected from political tides
in that the board membership is fixed, but also flexible in that much of the actual
decisionmaking is outside of the constitutionally-defined board. Admittedly, making
recommendations at the subcommittee level does leave the development of standards
vulnerable to agency capture, but because the board’s membership is constitutionally
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defined and because the board chooses subcommittee members, the vulnerability of the
process is mitigated.
While some citizens of Ohio may maintain that the Ohio Livestock Care
Standards Board is just one more way we are told what to do by an over-reaching
bureaucracy or that the board limits true democratic participation, the board now has the
responsibility of remaining responsive to the public’s concerns, and those of the
agriculture industry, while carrying out the work defined for it in the implementing
legislation. It can do that by working to prevent being captured by agricultural or animal
welfare activists in its decision-making processes and by continuing to routinely involve
all interested parties in working together to develop the “best” solutions for Ohio,
whether that be endorsing current livestock management practices or defining more
stringent, minimum standards. As the president and chief executive officer of the
American Humane Association, an animal welfare interest group entirely distinct from
the Humane Society, emphasized after Issue 2 passed in Ohio:
Our experience working with agricultural interests has shown that the
most effective reform of animal welfare standards comes when the
solutions are not only good for animals, but good for people who buy food
and good for farmers, too. …It is least effective when mandated or
legislated by outsiders. We think it’s important when farms, large and
small, are a part of the solution and voluntarily make good animal
husbandry a part of their operating procedures. (American Humane
Association November 4, 2009)
The creation of the Ohio Livestock Care Standards Board may look like a power grab to
some citizens, especially because it was an idea initially introduced by the state’s Farm
Bureau, but the board has become a body where everyone, including the public, can be
heard, and may actually create standards that address a wider range of animal welfare
concerns than any initiative would have in the state.
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IV. INSIGHTS FOR PUBLIC ADMINISTRATORS
The Ohio Livestock Care Standards Board is arguably the most representative and
most comprehensive approach to humane livestock standards development when
compared to direct democratic processes and traditional legislative approaches to the
problem. Across the United States, humane farm animal welfare initiatives have focused
on animal housing alone, but the board is chartered to examine multiple aspects of animal
care, not just housing. The board, as a bureaucratic entity, is more representative of the
general public than the legislature, which tends to be more elite than the public at large,
or the interest groups on either side of the argument. As a rulemaking body, the board
also provides more access to a greater number of people than the legislative process or
the initiative process, both of which are heavily influenced by money. Ohio’s board is a
well-balanced board with a well-designed process underlying its decision making;
however, a key element of accountability – the threat of an initiative – is not possible in
all states. Thus, the board and the processes behind it may only be a sound model for
states that permit the initiative.
Perhaps the single most important aspect of Ohio’s model to define industry
regulation is involving a wide-variety or people or groups likely to be impacted by the
proposed regulations or with an interest in the ethics underlying the rules. Ohio’s process
does that reasonably well. In an effort to create regulations that match what public
interest groups hope to achieve, while also representing the concerns of special interest
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groups, Ohio’s Livestock Care Standards Board invites a wide-variety of people and
groups to be involved in board and subcommittee discussions. In this manner, the
bureaucratic group responsible for defining regulations is left with the latitude to seek out
information from special interest groups, public interest groups, and other administrative
bodies (Kerwin and Furlong 2011, 102), but is also governed by official language
defining the inclusion of certain groups who generally have adversarial relationships. In
this way, Ohio’s regulatory process has attempted to purposefully include public interest
group representation (Berry 1977) in collaborative decision making (Fischer 1990), so
that the process of regulating how animals are raised on farms in Ohio does not become
another example of industry self-regulation (Kolko 1963), which puts economic
competitiveness first and public interest second.
Figure 1 visually represents the major players and the process of developing
livestock regulations in Ohio. Ohio’s regulations, formalized as part of the Ohio Revised
Code and implemented and enforced by the Department of Agriculture, are formally
written by the board. But before they get to the board, these standards are drafted by
people with working-level, practical knowledge of the topic with guidance from scientific
and academic experts. These “technocrats” then submit their recommendations to the
board, the “bureaucrats,” for final adoption and an initial public comment period. After
being adopted by the board, the enforcement agency submits the rules for JCARR review
and a formal public comment period. After review and required revisions, the rules take
effect and are implemented by the regulating agency.
Technocrats, or those with specialized knowledge in the science or practice of
animal husbandry, play an important role in defining the regulations; however, that role is
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secondary to the decisions of the board, the bureaucrats. While the technocrats make key
recommendations regarding standards, the bureaucrats have the final say on whether
those regulations are responsive to both public and special interests before they are
submitted for final approval in the legislature. In this way, Ohio’s livestock regulatory
process includes the specialized knowledge which helps inform regulations while
protecting democratic institutions from the elitist threat of technocratic decision making.
In effect, it seems to balance representative bureaucracy with technocracy.

Figure 1. Ohio’s Livestock Regulatory Process and Key Players
Along the road to defining rules, the public is provided opportunities to comment
on the discussions at board meetings, the draft rules being written and rules being
submitted for final, formal review. However, the public remains a largely unorganized
and latent group and relies heavily on public interest groups to act as proxies. Those
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public interest groups are balanced by special interest groups, all of which remain
engaged in directly influencing the board’s final standards by providing written and oral
comments at meetings and by supplying research that supports the creation of certain
standards. Of course, the special and public interest groups also try to indirectly
influence the regulatory process by engaging media outlets and public relation firms to
publicize each groups’ point of view. These direct engagements with media and public
relations professionals indirectly influence both the administrative rulemaking process
and the potential initiative process that continues to influence regulatory decision making
in Ohio.

FINE-TUNING THE PROCESS
Despite a sound foundation, the Ohio Livestock Care Standards Board will face
significant challenges in the near future. Most notably, the board still faces the challenge
of making some of its more difficult decisions. It also faces the challenge of remaining
relevant and dedicated to a collaborative process after changes in membership begin in
2011 and under a new gubernatorial administration. As such, the board or the processes
it had defined may need to be adapted to ensure all interested parties remain engaged in
the problem-setting process and the board remains a relevant body in agricultural
rulemaking. However, adapting the board will be difficult in Ohio because a
constitutional amendment is required to change the board’s original membership, which
was also defined in a constitutional amendment. Consequently, shortcomings in the
board’s makeup, although not anticipated to affect the board’s relevancy or commitment,
will be difficult to change. On the other hand, as seems to be the case in Ohio, enshrining
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the rulemaking agency in the constitution seems to be protecting it from changes to the
gubernatorial administration, which shifted from a Democrat who sought out
collaborative decision-making opportunities to a Republican who favors fewer
regulations on private industry. Fortunately, despite the constitutional constraints on the
board’s work, many of the rulemaking processes the board has adopted remain outside of
the constitutional mandate, and so remain flexible and adaptable. However, these
processes then become susceptible to shifts in the political landscape. For both reasons –
because the board membership is relatively unchangeable if it is needs amended and
because the processes below the board level remain susceptible to agency capture –
keeping public interest groups and citizens engaged will require innovative approaches
under traditional feedback and public involvement constructs.
To that end, the Department of Agriculture must do a better job of reaching out to
the public to engage them in the feedback process. While they have done so in a limited
fashion, their efforts are concentrated on formal feedback mechanisms and attendance at
meetings and venues where agricultural groups are likely to make up the majority of the
audience. To truly solicit genuine public feedback on the process and the draft standards,
the Department of Agriculture must develop more innovative communication strategies
to explain the potential impact of draft regulations on the consumer or the reasoning
behind certain decisions. The Ohio State University extension service has already
created a position dedicated to educating the public about livestock care standards board
decisions, but more could be done to engage food security advocacy groups, hobby
farmer networks, and alternative agriculture groups in educating the public about board
decisions. Doing so may create feedback avenues that help clarify how accurately the
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mobilized public interest proxy group is portraying public interests and impact a
producer’s attitude about adopting new, or fighting for old, standards. In general, more
feedback from the public – producer and consumer alike – and not just public or special
interest groups creates dialogue that broadens the knowledge of the participants creating
regulations and potentially helps create buy-in for a negotiated regulatory process by
establishing common ground.
Creating public awareness about the board’s decisions may also reinforce
weaknesses in the enforcement process. At present, the amount of effort expended in
investigating reported violations of state statutes regarding livestock husbandry is
dependent on the resources allocated to investigations and the political climate of the
regulating agency. While both can be expected to ebb and flow over time with changes
in economic situations and political administrations, educating the public cannot hurt
enforcement efforts. Public understanding of the exact roles and responsibilities of the
regulating agency may influence it to take action where it might otherwise have remained
inactive. Similarly, public knowledge about what the standards are and what they mean
to consumers and producers can also serve to motivate producer compliance. Leadership
of commodity groups dedicated to hearing the public’s concerns, as brought to light
through the negotiated regulation process, may see the benefit in complying with
regulations that accurately reflect public interests. In many cases, an engaged public is
paramount to government accountability.

PUBLIC INPUT VIA DIRECT DEMOCRACY
In certain circumstances, the government – whether it be the body creating
regulations or the agency enforcing them – may become unresponsive to the public. In that
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case, the public may choose to take governance into their own hands and initiate a campaign
to create certain legislation through direct democracy. In Ohio, direct democracy has played
and continues to play an influential role in the regulatory process.
The process that led to the creation of the Ohio Livestock Care Standards Board
and Ohio’s 2009 legislative referendum, Issue 2, demonstrated the influence money has
on direct democracy. Essentially, the 2009 referendum campaign pitted Ohioans against
“outsiders” who threatened to destroy Ohio agriculture. The potential 2010 initiative
campaign would have pitted the two well-funded extremes – traditional agriculture and
animal welfare groups – against each other again, forcing the public to choose between
two emotionally charged campaigns and eliminating any chance to find middle ground.
In some ways, then, and as the process played out in 2009 and 2010 in Ohio, direct
democracy seems no less susceptible to special or public interest capture than the
legislative process.
As Ohio is demonstrating, establishing a bureaucratic agency and giving all
substantial interests, including the public, access to it and its membership mitigates the
influence of interest group funding of campaigns by limiting emotional appeals that can
influence the rulemaking and policy processes. Certainly, the interest groups with the
upper hand in the legislative and direct democratic processes maintain important access
and influence to the bureaucratic agency, but this is often because they are the very
groups with the specialized information the bureaucratic groups need to inform their
decisions and recommendations. However, the board also affords access to other experts,
like academics, who might otherwise not have contributed information to the decisionmaking process, and to the general public, who often lacks the time, money or personal
connections required to truly be heard by legislators or to build or maintain the necessary
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support and momentum to become a meaningful player in the political process. In this
way, a well-established advisory council or bureaucratic agency can balance the expert
knowledge provided by technocrats with the values expressed by the public. Expertise is
often necessary when there is no easy policy solution, but a complete reliance on
technocrats with specialized knowledge amounts to government by the elite and can
jeopardize democratic values. To protect them, the board must remain accountable to the
public.
Accountability to the public may be difficult because the public’s opinion may be
hard to hear. As Olson points out, the public at large can often act as a latent group with
little or no motivation to act in its own interest. Because of this, the best way to ensure
public accountability may be through a proxy group. In Ohio, the board members are
held accountable to considering public values and avoiding special interest capture by the
Humane Society, which maintains a near-constant presence at the board’s meetings. Its
influence has been formalized in The Agreement, which prevents the board from being
captured by agricultural interests and makes the public interest group’s goals clear, and
the residual threat of an initiative from animal welfare groups should The Agreement
become null. By no means is a similar “contract” feasible in all policy solution
discussions, nor is such a powerful public interest group always going to be involved, so
more must be done to encourage participation directly by the general public and, once
encouraged, the participation must not be written off by policymakers or those
implementing the policies. Like the Ohio Livestock Care Standards Board process, much
of the public participation in policy and rulemaking processes is confined to opportunities
for public comment at board meetings, committee meetings and during the more formal
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rules review process. Often, these public comments fall on deaf ears and the process of
actually permitting public comment seems more symbolic than substantive. Rulemakers
and policy makers must make a greater effort to listen for, hear, and consider public
comments through the informal and formal stages of rulemaking.

NEGOTIATED REGULATION
Despite the challenges laid forth in this paper, the Ohio Livestock Care Standards
Board can offer unique lessons for public administrators facing difficult problems,
problems with no easy solutions, numerous interests and interest groups vying for
relevance and divergent end goals, and a wide range of policy primary and secondary
impacts. As Kerwin and Furlong point out, “when rulemakings require complex and
varied information and affect multiple interests, and when consensus in decisions is
important, this function may be given to a work group or task force” (2011, 144).
Creating a task force to examine a problem does not necessarily mean the task force will
have success in creating rules that all parties can agree on. Playing off Fischer, who
defined the importance of problem setting and inviting all interests to join the discussion
in public policy making (Fischer 1990), and Berry, who argues governments should
facilitate the access public interest groups have to legislative and executive processes
(Berry 1977), Kerwin and Furlong note that “negotiated rulemaking depends in large part
on the ability to identify and invite to the table all the substantially affected interests”
(2011, 206). What sets Kerwin and Furlong apart from Fischer and Berry is one final
argument: “rules that present conflict over deeply held values are not candidates for
negotiation” (Kerwin and Furlong 2011, 206). Ohio’s Livestock Care Standards Board
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offers proof that even groups with fundamentally divergent interests can work together in
an advisory council or task force to facilitate compromises and to create rules or policy
options that all parties can support. Although the interests of agricultural establishment
groups fundamentally diverge from animal welfare groups – with one group ultimately
concentrating on providing low-production-cost food for the market and the other group
pushing for increased awareness and attention to an animal’s mental and physical wellbeing – both sides have demonstrated a preference for participatory rulemaking where the
reasons behind various practices can be examined, discussed, and adopted or amended
based on the best available knowledge, and where public education can ultimately be the
recommendation so that citizens at large can understand more about why certain
standards are acceptable or not. This preference for working together to solve potentially
divisive public problems offers hope to federal, state and local administrations that policy
making and rulemaking need not always be adversarial. Furthermore, it supports the
concept that increasing the access of public interest groups to the policy making process
by inviting them to the table frequently already occupied by special interests can result in
more, and better, policy options.
Bringing the right groups, people and interests to the table becomes even more
important when one considers the enforcement power of some bureaucratic agencies and
advisory councils is limited at best. As is the case with the Ohio Livestock Care
Standards Board, many policymaking bodies must rely on others to enforce the rules or
standards they adopt. In many cases, the agricultural groups currently involved in efforts
to limit changes to current practices are the same groups who will enforce the board’s
recommendations. This is not a unique situation in industry regulation. The groups
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expected to be affected most by policy changes often essentially enforce rules and
standards. Thus, getting buy-in early from those interests who are required to enforce
standards becomes important. Buy-in is also important when other parts or levels of
government are expected to become enforcement agents. Representatives of all of these
enforcement agencies must be brought to the table alongside other groups with an interest
in the policy problem.
Bureaucratic rulemaking, with its reliance of technocratic expertise and interest
groups for information, can certainly become a highly undemocratic process. But when
government executives work together with interest groups and the public to create
advisory councils and rulemaking bodies that purposefully bring together a wide variety
of groups and individuals with a substantive interest in a given policy problem, these
rulemaking bodies may represent government’s best chance at developing sound policy
based on scientific evidence and public preferences.
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APPENDIX A
METHODOLOGY
The research approach for this paper began as a comparative case study. The
author examined what other states had or were developing and implementing humane
livestock standards, how the discussion about developing such standards began in those
states, who the major players or interest groups supporting or opposing such standards
were, and the process by which standards were being developed or implement. After a
brief survey of 18 states, the author narrowed her research to states whose development
or implementation of humane livestock treatment standards influenced the call for such
standards in Ohio or whose process, or proposed process, for defining standards differed
significantly from or was most similar to Ohio’s proposed process. The narrowing of her
research led her to focus on: Florida, who was the first state to adopt minimum livestock
standards in 2002 through a citizen-initiated constitutional amendment; Arizona, who
passed a ballot initiative outlawing certain practices in 2006; Oregon, whose legislature
passed legislation in 2007 that outlawed similar practices; California, where the Humane
Society won a high-profile popular initiative in 2008 despite strong opposition of
agricultural interests in the state; Colorado, who relied on a neutral negotiator to broker a
deal between animal welfare groups and agricultural groups to avoid a ballot initiative
while, via the legislature, banning certain confinement practices and establishing a
bureaucratic body to address future livestock standard concerns; and Michigan, where
elected leaders in the executive and legislative branches worked out a compromise
between the Humane Society and agricultural groups that restricted confinement practices
and created an advisory council to address future farm animal welfare issues. The brief
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examination of these various states’ processes for addressing the development of humane
livestock standards was used to inform the detailed survey of the interest groups and
people integral to the creation of the Ohio Livestock Care Standards Board and the
process by which the board is adopting minimum standards to govern livestock care in
Ohio.
The survey of Ohio involved reading the testimony given to the Ohio House
Agriculture and Natural Resources Committee and Senate Agriculture Committees prior
to the passage of Senate Joint Resolution 6, which placed Issue 2 on the ballot for public
approval in November 2009, and prior to the passage of House Bill 414, the
implementing legislation following the successful legislative referendum, in early 2010.
Additionally, the author read the letters to the editor and opinion and editorial pieces
from four of Ohio’s top newspaper – The Blade (Toledo), The Columbus Dispatch,
Dayton Daily News, and The Plain Dealer (Cleveland) – in order to gauge the types of
groups interested and invested in the debate about how the process of developing
standards in Ohio should work. To inform her understanding of how the Ohio Livestock
Care Standards Board came to be and how the board was addressing the creation of farm
animal treatment standards, the author also conducted interviews with 10 people
intimately involved in the creation of the board and the process by which the board is
creating standards (Table 4). Although the majority of the author’s interviews were
conducted on the phone, the author had previously established lines of communication
with many of the interviewees when she attended a board listening session to observe the
process and kinds of comments expressed in the summer of 2010.
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The foundation for the method of inquiry rested on an understanding of when and
why regulated industries initiate regulation (Kolko 1963; Edelman 1985), the roles of
interest groups in policy and regulation (Berry 1997), the provision of collective goods
and incentives (Olson 1965), the importance of problem setting in public policy (Fischer
1990), the representative role of bureaucrats in decision making (Fritschler 1996), and the
influence of “fixers” in the policy process (Bardach 1979).
Table 4. People with Whom the Author Conducted Interviews
Title(s)
Date (contact method)
Ohio Livestock Care Standards Board (OLCSB)
Oct. 1, 2010 (phone)
Chairman and Ohio Department of Agriculture Director
Lisa Hamler-Fugitt OLCSB member (consumer representative)
Oct. 1, 2010 (phone)
Stacey Atherton
OLCSB member (family farmer representative)
Oct. 11, 2010 (phone)
Michelle
Ohio Veterinary Medical Association Government
Oct. 13, 2010 (phone)
Holdgreve
Relations Director
Jack Advent
Ohio Veterinary Medical Association Executive Director Oct. 13, 2010 (phone)
Keith Stimpert
Ohio Farm Bureau Federation Senior Vice President for
Oct. 13, 2010 (phone)
Public Policy
Karen Minton
The Humane Society of the United States Ohio State
Nov. 3, 2010 (phone)
Director
Anonymous
Ohio General Assembly Staffer
Nov. 19, 2010 (phone)
Jennifer Lynch
Ohio Governor Ted Strickland’s Executive Assistant for
Nov. 30, 2010 (in
Agriculture, Environment, Energy, Utility & Insurance
person)
Policy
Dick Isler
Ohio Pork Producers Council Executive Vice President
Dec. 1, 2010 (in person)
Name
Robert Boggs
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APPENDIX B
CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS FROM AGRICULTURAL OR AGRICULTURERELATED INDUSTRIES BY DOLLAR AMOUNT AND AS PERCENTAGE OF
TOTAL CONTRIBUTIONS FOR SELECT MEMBERS OF 111TH U.S. CONGRESS
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APPENDIX C
ORIGINAL OHIO LIVESTOCK CARE STANDARDS BOARD MEMBERS
Robert Boggs, Chairman of the Board
Mr. Boggs is the director of the Ohio Department of Agriculture. He previously served
as a state representative, state senator and county commissioner. He has a master’s in
public administration from Kent State University.
Tony Forshey, State Veterinarian
Dr. Forshey is the State Veterinarian for the Ohio Department of Agriculture. He is the
chairman of the Ohio Veterinary Medical Association Swine Sub-Committee to the Ohio
Department of Agriculture and co-chairman of the Swine Update Program in the
Department of Preventative Medicine at The Ohio State University. He received his
doctorate of veterinary medicine from The Ohio State University.
Leon Weaver, veterinarian
Dr. Weaver is the owner-operator of Bridgewater Dairy, and a board member for the
Ohio Livestock Coalition and the Ohio Dairy Industry Forum. He previously taught at
the University of California’s Veterinarian Medicine School. He received his doctorate
of veterinary medicine from the University of Pennsylvania.
Jeff Wuebker, statewide farm organization representative
Mr. Wuebker is the co-owner of Wuebker Farms. He is also president of the Ohio
Soybean Association and a member of the Ohio Corn Growers Association and Ohio
Cattlemen’s Association.
Bobby Moser, agriculture dean
Dr. Moser is the vice president for agriculture and the dean of the college of Food,
Agricultural, and Environmental Sciences at The Ohio State University. He was
previously the associate dean of agriculture and extension program director at the
University of Missouri and a professor at the University of Nebraska.
Jeffrey LeJeune, food safety expert
Dr. LeJeune is an associate professor for Food and Animal Health at the Ohio
Agricultural Research and Development Center at The Ohio State University, where he is
also the chair of the Agriculture Animal Care and Use Committee.
Harold Dates, county humane society representative
Mr. Dates is the president and CEO of the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to
Animals of Cincinnati.
Jerry Lahmers, statewide farm organization representative
Dr. Lahmers is the owner-operator of a family farm and a veterinarian. He previously
served as the president of the Tuscarawas County Farm Bureau and was a member of the
Ohio Veterinary Medical Licensing Board. He received his doctorate of veterinary
medicine from The Ohio State University.
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Lisa M. Hamler-Fugitt, consumer
Ms. Hamler-Fugitt is the executive director of the Ohio Association of Second Harvest
Foodbanks and legislative liaison for the Ohio Alliance of Boys & Girls Clubs. She was
previously the public policy director for the Ohio Hunger Task Force.
Robert Cole, consumer
Mr. Cole is a retired U.S. Department of Agriculture employee, where he was the
executive director of the USDA’s Franklin County Office and acting state director, and
helps manage his family farm in Mississippi.
Stacey Atherton, family farmer
Ms. Atherton is co-owner of Shipley Farms, where she previously served as manager.
She is a 4-H club advisor and member of the Ohio Dairy Producers and the Ohio Farm
Bureau.
Bill Moody, family farmer
Mr. Moody is the board member appointed by the Ohio Senate President. He is the
former assistant director of the Ohio Department of Natural Resources, and farms a small
commercial sheep and hay farm.
Dominic Marchese, family farmer
Mr. Marchese is the board member appointed by the Ohio Speaker of the House. He is
the owner-operator of the certified organic Manna Farms. He formerly raised dairy cows,
and now raises beef cattle, chickens and hay.
(Source: http://www.ohiolivestockcarestandardsboard.org/content/board/about_board.aspx)
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APPENDIX D
SUMMARY OF PUBLIC ORAL AND WRITTEN COMMENTS FROM OHIO
LIVESTOCK CARE STANDARDS BOARD MEETINGS,
JUNE 15 TO NOVEMBER 2, 2010
Figure 2. Summary of Public Oral and Written Comments from Ohio Livestock
Care Standards Board Meetings, June 15 to November 2, 2010

(Source: Ohio Livestock Care Standards Board Meeting Minutes,
http://www.ohiolivestockcarestandardsboard.gov/content/news/mminutes.aspx)
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APPENDIX E
“THE AGREEMENT”
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(Source: Karen Minton, Ohio State Director for The Humane Society of the United States, in discussion
with the author, November 2010, in discussion with the author.)
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APPENDIX F
OHIO LIVESTOCK CARE STANDARDS BOARD’S
PROCESS DESIGN FOR STANDARD DEVELOPMENT
Figure 3. Ohio Livestock Care Standards Board’s
Process Design for Standard Development

(Source: http://www.ohiolivestockcarestandardsboard.gov)
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